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A SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR GAMES WITH ALTRUISM AND
COOPERATION
VALERIO CAPRARO
Update Sept. 9th, 2013. Parts of this paper (concerning social dilemmas) have
been published in [Ca13] and [CVPJ]. This Working Paper is an attempt to extend the
theory developed in those published paper to all normal form games.
Abstract. Over the years, numerous experiments have been accumulated to show
that cooperation is not casual and depends on the payoffs of the game. These findings
suggest that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may
act more or less cooperatively depending on the particular payoffs. In other words,
people do not act a priori as single agents, but they forecast how the game would be
played if they formed coalitions and then they play according to their best forecast.
In this paper we formalize this idea and we define a new solution concept for
one-shot normal form games.
We prove that this cooperative equilibrium exists for all finite games and it explains
a number of different experimental findings, such as (1) the rate of cooperation in the
Prisoner’s dilemma depends on the cost-benefit ratio; (2) the rate of cooperation in the
Traveler’s dilemma depends on the bonus/penalty; (3) the rate of cooperation in the
Publig Goods game depends on the pro-capite marginal return and on the numbers
of players; (4) the rate of cooperation in the Bertrand competition depends on the
number of players; (5) players tend to be fair in the bargaining problem; (6) players
tend to be fair in the Ultimatum game; (7) players tend to be altruist in the Dicta-
tor game; (8) offers in the Ultimatum game are larger than offers in the Dictator game.
JEL Classification: C71, C72.
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1. Introduction
Since its foundation by Morgenstern and von Neumann [Mo-vN44], the major chal-
lenge of modern game theory has been to predict which actions a human player would
adopt in a strategic situation. A first prediction was proposed in an earlier paper by
J. von Neumann [vN28] for two-person zero-sum games and then generalized to every
finite game by J. Nash in [Na50a]. Since then Nash equilibrium has certainly been the
most notable and used solution concept in game theory. Nevertheless, over the last sixty
years, it has been realized that it makes poor predictions of human play and, indeed, a
large number of experiments have been conducted on games for which it drammatically
fails to predict human behavior.
There are many reasons behind this failure. On the one hand, when there are multiple
equilibria, it is not clear which one we should expect is going to be played. A whole
stream of literature, finalized to the selection of one equilibrium, arose from this point,
including the definitions of evolutionarily stable strategy [MS-Pr73], perfect equilibrium
[Se75], trembling hand perfect equilibrium [Se75], proper equilibrium [My78], sequential
equilibrium [Kr-Wi82], limit logit equilibrium [MK-Pa95], and, very recently, settled
equilibrium [My-We12].
On the other hand, the criticism of Nash equilibrium is motivated by more seri-
ous problems: there are examples of games with a unique Nash equilibrium which is
not played by human players. Typical examples of such a fastidious situation are the
Prisoner’s Dilemma [Fl52], the Traveler’s Dilemma [Ba94], and, more generally, every
social dilemma [Ko88]. This point has motivated another stream of literature devoted
to the explanation of such deviations from Nash equilibria. Part of this literature tries
to explain such deviations assuming that players make mistakes in the computation
of the expected value of a strategy and therefore, assuming that errors are identically
distributed, a player may also play non-optimal strategies with a probability described
by a Weibull distribution. This intuition led to the foundation of the so-called quantal
response equilibrium theory by McKelvey and Palfrey [MK-Pa95]. A variant of this the-
ory, called quantal level-k theory and proposed by Stahl and P. Wilson in [St-Wi94], was
recently shown to perform better in the prediction of human behavior [Wr-LB10]. In
the same paper, Wright and Leyton-Brown have also shown that quantal level-k theory
predicts human behavior significantly better than all other behavioral models that have
been proposed in the last decade, as the level-k theory [CG-Cr-Br01] and the cognitive
hierarchy model [Ca-Ho-Ch04]. However, an obvious criticism of quantal level-k theory
is that it is not scale invariant, contradicting one of the axioms of expected utility theory
of Morgenstern and von Neumann[Mo-vN47]. A perhaps more fundamental criticism
stems from the fact that quantal level-k theory only makes use of some parameters de-
scribing either the incidence of errors that a player can make computing the expected
utility of a strategy or the fact that humans can perform only a bounded number of
iterations of strategic reasoning. These features first imply that quantal level-k theory
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is not predictive, in the sense that one has to conduct experiments to estimate the
parameters; second, they imply that quantal level-k theory intrinsically affirms that de-
viation from Nash equilibria can descend only from two causes, computational mistakes
and bounded rationality, that are hard to justify for games with very easy payoffs, like
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, or for games where the deviation from Nash equilibrium is
particularly strong, like the Traveler’s Dilemma with small bonus-penalty.
Indeed, the general feeling is that the motivation must rely somewhere deeper and
that Nash equilibrium should be replaced by a conceptually different solution concept
that takes into account other features of human behavior and coincides with Nash equi-
librium only in particular cases. The first studies in this direction have been presented
by Renou and Schlag [Re-Sc09] and Halpern and Pass [Ha-Pa12], by Halpern and Rong
[Ha-Ro10], by Halpern and Pass [Ha-Pa11], by Jamroga and Melissen [Ja-Me11], and
by Adam and Ehud Kalai [Ka-Ka13]. Nevertheless, even though these solution con-
cepts can explain deviations from Nash equilibria in some particular games, all of them
make unreasonable predictions for many games of interest. For instance, the maxi-
mum perfect cooperative equilibrium introduced in [Ha-Ro10] is too rigid and predicts
cooperation for sure in the Prisoner’s and Traveler’s Dilemmas, contradicting the ex-
perimental data collected in [Ca-Go-Go-Ho99], [Go-Ho01], [Be-Ca-Na05], [Ba-Be-St11],
[HRZ11], [DEJR12], [Fu-Ra-Dr12], [RGN12]. The iterated regret minimization proce-
dure introduced in [Re-Sc09] and [Ha-Pa12] can explain deviations towards cooperation
in some variants of the Traveler’s Dilemma, the Bertrand competition, the Centipede
Game, and other games of interest, but it does not predict deviation towards coop-
eration in the Prisoner’s Dilemma [HRZ11], [DEJR12], [Fu-Ra-Dr12], [RGN12] and in
the public good game [Le95], it cannot explain altruistic behaviors in the ultimatum
game [Fe-Sc99] and in the dictator game [En11], and makes unreasonable predictions
for the Traveler’s dilemma with punishment (see Example 5.11), and a certain zero-
sum game (see Example 8.3). The solution concept defined using algorithmic ratio-
nability in [Ha-Pa11] can explain deviation towards cooperation in the iterated Pris-
oner’s and Traveler’s dilemmas, but it does not predict deviation towards cooperation
in one-shot versions of the Prisoner’s dilemma or in one-shot versions of the Traveler’s
dilemma with very small bonus-penalty, contradicting the experimental data reported
in [Go-Ho01], [Be-Ca-Na05], [HRZ11], [DEJR12], [Fu-Ra-Dr12], [RGN12]. The far-
sighted pre-equilibrium introduced in [Ja-Me11] is too rigid. For instance, the Prisoner’s
dilemma has two farsighted pre-equilibria, which coincide with Rabin’s fairness equilib-
ria [Ra93], where both players either cooperate or defect for sure. This contradicts the
experimental data reported in [HRZ11], [DEJR12], [Fu-Ra-Dr12], [RGN12], which sug-
gest that humans tend to play a mixed strategy. Finally, the coco value introduced by
Adam and Ehud Kalai in [Ka-Ka13], unifying and developing previous works by Nash
[Na53], Raiffa [Rai53], and E.Kalai-Rosenthal [Ka-Ro78], also appears to be too rigid.
For instance, if two agents played the Prisoner’s dilemma according to the coco value,
then they would both cooperate for sure. This prediction contradicts the experimental
data collected in [HRZ11], [DEJR12], [Fu-Ra-Dr12], [RGN12].
In this paper we try to attribute the failure of all these attempts to two basic problems.
The first problem is the use of utility functions in the very definition of a game. In-
deed, the experimental evidence have shown that expected utility theory fails to predict
the behavior of decision makers [Al53], [Ka-Tv00], [St00].
This problem could be theoretically overcome replacing utility functions with gain
functions and applying Kahneman-Tversky’s cumulative prospect theory [Tv-Ka92].
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But one can easily convince himself that in most cases such a replacement could explain
only quantitative deviations.
The second problem is indeed that experiments conducted on the Prisoner’s dilemma,
the Traveler’s dilemma, Dictator game, and other games, show qualitative deviations
from classical solution concepts. These qualitative deviations suggest that humans are
altruistic and have attitude to cooperation.
These observations motivate the definition of a new solution concept, able to take into
account altruism and cooperation and using gain functions instead of utility functions.
This paper represents a first endeavour in this direction. Indeed, here we consider
only one-shot normal form games where the players are completely anonymous, that
is, they do not know each other and they are not allowed to exchange information1.
The aim of this paper is to define a new solution concept for this class of games. This
solution concept will be called cooperative equilibrium. Indeed, we will see that altruism
plays only a marginal role and the main idea behind this new equilibrium notion is the
formalization of the following principle of cooperation:
(C) Players try to forecast how the game would be played if they formed coalitions
and then they play according to their best forecast.
The study of cooperation in games is not a new idea. Economists, biologists, psy-
chologists, sociologists, and political scientists, have been studying cooperation in social
dilemmas for forty years. These classical approaches explain tendency to cooperation
dividing people in proself and prosocial types [Li84], [LWVW86], [KMM86], [KCC86],
[ML88], or appealing to forms of external control [Ol65], [Ha68], [Da80], or to long-
term strategies in iterated games[Ax84]. But, over the years many experiments have
been accumulated to show cooperation even in one-shot social dilemmas without exter-
nal control [Is-Wa88], [Co-DJ-Fo-Ro96], [Go-Ho01], [Be-Ca-Na05], [DRFN08], [HRZ11],
[DEJR12]. These and other earlier experiments [Ke-Gr72], [BSKM76], [KSK80], [IWT84]
have also shown that the rate of cooperation in the same game depends on the partic-
ular payoffs, suggesting that most likely humans cannot be merely divided in proself
and prosocial types, but they are engaged in some sort of indirect reciprocity [No-Si98],
[No06] and the same person may behave more or less cooperatively depending on the
payoffs. In other words, humans have attitude to cooperation by nature.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to lift this well known tendency
to cooperate up to a general principle which is nothing more than a deeper and smarter
realization of selfishness.
The idea to formalize the principle of cooperation and define the cooperative equilib-
rium can be briefly summarized as follows:
• We assume that players do not act a priori as single players, but they try to
forecast how the game would be played if they formed coalitions.
• Each forecast is represented by a number vi(p), called value of the coalition
structure p for player i, which is a measure of the expected gain of player i
when she plays according to the coalition structure p.
• The numbers vi(p) induce a sort of common beliefs: we consider the induced
game Ind(G, p) which differs from the original game G only for the set of allowed
profiles of mixed strategies: the profiles of mixed strategies allowed in Ind(G, p)
are the profiles (σ1, . . . , σN ) such that ui(σ1, . . . , σN ) ≥ vi(p), for any player i.
1We mention that anonimity is not really a necessary assumption: the effect of any sort of contact
among the players would be a different evaluation of the so-called prior probability τ . The point is that
at the moment it is not clear how this prior probability should be re-evaluated.
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• The exact cooperative equilibrium is one where player i plays an equilibrium of
the game Ind(G, p) induced by a coalition structure which maximizes the value
function vi
2.
• The notion of equilibrium for the induced game Ind(G, p) is not defined using
classical Nash equilibrium, but using a prospect theoretical analogue.
In order to apply prospect theory we must replace utility functions by gain functions,
that are, functions whose values represent the monetary outcomes or, more generally, the
quantity of some good which is won or lost by a player. This replacement comes at the
price that we must take into account explicitly new data that were implicitly included in
the utility functions. Indeed, while utility functions were supposed to contain all relevant
information about players’ preferences, gain functions do contain only the quantity of
some good which is won or lost by the players. These new data include the fairness
functions fi and the altruism functions aij. An interesting feature of the cooperative
equilibrium is that, in many games of interest, it does not depend on these functions.
This implies that the cooperative equilibrium is a predictive solution concept for many
games of interest. A bit more precisely, in this paper we prove the following statements.
Fact 1.1. The cooperative equilibrium for the Prisoner’s dilemma is predictive (i.e.,
it does not depend on fairness functions and altruism functions) and has the following
property: the predicted rate of cooperation increases as the cost-benefit ratio increases.
Fact 1.2. The cooperative equilibrium for the Traveler’s dilemma is predictive and has
the following property: the predicted rate of cooperation decreases as the bonus/penalty
increases.
Fact 1.3. The cooperative equilibrium for the Bertrand competition is predictive and it
has the following property: the predicted rate of cooperation decreases as the numbers
of players increase.
Fact 1.4. The cooperative equilibrium fits Kahneman-Knetsch-Thaler’s experiment
related to the ultimatum game.
Fact 1.5. The cooperative equilibrium for the public good game is predictive and it has
the following properties: (1) the predicted rate of cooperation increases as the marginal
return increases, and (2) the predicted rate of cooperation decreases as the number
of players increases and then increases again as the number of players gets sufficiently
large.
Fact 1.6. The cooperative equilibrium predicts the (50,50) solution in the Bargaining
problem under natural assumptions on the fairness functions.
Roughly speaking, the natural assumption is that the two players have the same
perception of money. We believe that this assumption is natural, since it is predictable
that a bargain between a very rich person and a very poor person can have a different
solution.
Fact 1.7. The cooperative equilibrium explains the experimental data collected for the
dictator game, via altruism.
2The word exact means that, since players can have bounded rationality or can make mistakes in
the computations, one can also define a quantal cooperative equilibrium borrowing ideas from quan-
tal response equilibrium and quantal level-k theory and say that player i plays with probability
eλvi(p)/
∑
p
eλvi(p) a quantal response equilibrium or a quantal level-k equilibrium of the game Ind(G, p).
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This happens just because we define the altruism in terms of human behavior in the
dictator game. To treat the dictator game as the quintessence of altruism is certainly
not a new idea [Ha-Kr00], [BEN11], [DFR11].
Fact 1.8. The cooperative equilibrium explain the experimental data collected for the
ultimatum game, via a combination of cooperation and altruism.
In particular, the observation that offers in the ultimatum game are larger then the
offers in the dictator game is explained in terms of cooperation, which is generated by
the fact that the responder has the power to reject proposer’s offer.
Another case where the cooperative equilibrium is only descriptive is when the mis-
takes that players can make in the computations have a very strong influence on the
result. A typical example is the following.
Fact 1.9. The quantal cooperative equilibrium explains Goeree-Holt’s experiment on
the asymmetric matching pennies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we define the so-called games
in explicit form (see Definition 2.3), where the word explicit really emphasize the fact
that we have to take into account explicitly new data (altruism functions and fairness
functions). In Section 3 we describe informally the idea through a simple example that
allows to motivate all main definitions of the theory. In Section 4 we define the coopera-
tive equilibrium for games in explicit form under expected utility theory, that is, without
using cumulative prospect theory, and without using the altruism functions (see Defini-
tion 4.14). The reason of this choice is that in most cases cumulative prospect theory
can change predictions only quantitatively and not qualitatively and that, in most cases,
altruism functions do not play any active role. Indeed, we compute the cooperative equi-
librium (under expected utility theory and without using the altruism functions) for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Examples 4.5 and 5.2), Traveler’s Dilemma (see Examples 4.6
and 5.1), Nash bargaining problem (see Example 4.4 and 5.9), Bertrand competition
(see Example 5.4), public goods game (see Example 5.7), the ultimatum game (see Ex-
ample 5.5), and a specific game of particular interest since iterated regret minimization
theory fails to predict human behavior, whereas the cooperative equilibrium does (see
Example 5.11). We make a comparison between the predictions of the cooperative equi-
librium and the experimental data and we show that they are always close. In Section
6 we discuss a few examples where the replacement of expected utility theory by cumu-
lative prospect theory starts playing an active role (see Examples 6.1 and 6.2). Here it
starts the ideal second part of the paper, devoted to the definition of the cooperative
equilibrium for games in explicit form, using cumulative prospect theory and taking into
account altruism. Before doing that, we take a short section, namely Section 7, to give
a brief introduction to cumulative prospect theory. The definition of the cooperative
equilibrium under cumulative prospect theory and taking into account altruism takes
Sections 8 and 9: in the former we define a procedure of iterated deletion of strategies
using the altruism functions and we apply it to explain the experimental data collected
for the dictator game (see Example 8.10) and the ultimatum game (see Example 8.11);
in the latter we repeat the construction done in Section 4, this time under cumulative
prospect theory instead of expected utility theory. Theorem 9.6 shows that all finite
games have a cooperative equilibrium. Part of Section 8 may be of intrinsic interest,
since it contains the definition of super-dominated strategies3 (see Definition 8.1) and
3Joseph Halpern communicated to the author that he and Rafael Pass have independently introduced
super-dominated strategies (under the name minimax dominated strategies) in [Ha-Pa13].
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their application to solve a problem left open in [Ha-Pa12] (see Example 8.13). Section
10 states a few important problems that should be addressed in future researches.
2. Utility functions vs Gain functions: games in explicit form
As mentioned in the Introduction, a major innovation that we propose is the use
of gain functions instead of utility functions. In this section we first elaborate on the
reasons behind this choice and then we investigate the theoretical consequences of such
a choice. First recall the classical definition of a game in normal form.
Definition 2.1. A finite game in strategic or normal form is given by the following
data:
• a finite set of players P = {1, 2, . . . , N};
• for each player i ∈ P , a finite set of strategies Si;
• for each player i ∈ P , a preference relation ≤i on S := S1 × . . .× SN .
It is frequently convenient (and very often included in the definition of a game) to
specify the players’ preferences by giving real-valued utility functions ui : S → R that
represent them. The definition and the use of utility functions relies in Morgenstern
and von Neumann’s expected utility theory [Mo-vN47], where, to avoid problems such
as risk aversion, they assumed that players’ utility functions contain all relevant in-
formation about the players’ preferences over strategy profiles. In this way, Nash was
then able to formalize Bernoulli’s principle that each player attempts to maximize her
expected utility [Be738] given that the other players attempt to do the same. The use of
utility functions can certainly make the theory much easier, but it is problematic, since
it has been observed that humans constantly violate the principles of expected utility
theory. The very first of such examples was found by M. Allais in [Al53] and many
others are known nowadays (see, for instance, [Ka-Tv00] and [St00] for a large set of
examples). For the sake of completeness, we briefly describe one of these experiments
(see [Ka-Tv79], Problems 3 and 4). In this experiment 95 persons were asked to choose
between:
L1. A lottery where there is a probability of 0.80 to win 4000 and 0.20 to win nothing,
L2. A certain gain of 3000.
An expected utility maximizer would choose the lottery L1. However, Kahneman
and Tversky reported that 80 per cent of the individuals chose the certain gain. The
same 95 persons were then asked to choose between:
L1’. A lottery with a 0.20 chance of winning 4000 and 0.80 of winning nothing,
L2’. A lottery with a 0.25 chance of winning 3000 and 0.75 of winning nothing.
This time 65 per cent of the subjects chose the lottery L1’, which is also the lottery
maximizing expected utility. These two results contradict the so-called substitution
axiom in expected utility theory and show how people can behave as expected utility
maximizers or not depending on the particular situation they are facing.
An even more dramatic observation is that the evidence suggests that decision makers
weight probabilities in a non-linear manner, whereas expected utility theory postulates
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that they weight probabilities linearly. Consider, for instance, the following example
from [Ka-Tv79], p.283. Suppose that one is compelled to play Russian roulette. One
would be willing to pay much more to reduce the number of bullets from one to zero
than from four to three. However, in each case, the reduction in probability of a bullet
ring is 1/6 and so, under expected utility theory, the decision maker should be willing to
pay the same amount. One possible explanation is that decision makers do not weight
probabilities in a linear manner as postulated by expected utility theory.
These problems have been now overcome in decision theory thanks to the celebrated
prospect theory [Ka-Tv79] and cumulative prospect theory [Tv-Ka92]. One of the very
basic principles of (cumulative) prospect theory is that decision makers think in terms
of gains and losses rather than in terms of their net assets; in other words, they think
in term of gain functions rather than in terms of utility functions. This forces us to
replace utility functions by gain functions. This replacement comes at a price: while
utility functions were supposed to contain all relevant information about the players’
preferences, gain functions do not contain such information. They must be taken into
account separately. As we will remind in Section 7, risk aversion is taken into account
by cumulative prospect theory. Among the remaining relevant information there are (at
least) two deserving particular attention:
Altruism. A player may prefer to renounce to part of her gain in order to favor
another player.
Perception of gains. Two different players may have different perceptions
about the same amount of gain.
To define formally a game in terms of gain functions, we introduce a unit of mea-
surement g (tipically one dollar, one euro ...) and postulate that to every action profile
s ∈ S and to every player i ∈ P is associated a quantity gi(s) of g which is lost or won by
player i when the strategy profile s is played. We assume that the unit of measurement
(e.g., the currency) is common to all players. The losses are expressed by negative inte-
gers and the wins by positive integers, so that gi(s) = 2 will mean, for instance, that, if
the strategy profile s is played, then player i wins two units of the good g; analogously,
gi(s) = −3 will mean that, if the strategy profile s is played, then player i loses three
units of the good g.
Using the unit of measurement, we can take into account altruism and perception of
gains as follows.
Definition of the altruism functions. We define a notion of altruism opera-
tionally, that is, the altruism functions can be theoretically computed running a pre-
experiment. Consider a general dictator game as follows. A proposer has an endowment
of y ∈ N units of g and a responder has got already z ∈ Z units of g. Let k > 0, the
proposer chooses x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , y}, to transfer to the responder, who gets ⌊kx⌋, that is,
the largest integer smaller than or equal to kx. In other words, we define the two player
game Dict(k, y, z) where the strategy set of the first player is S1 = {0, 1, . . . , y} and the
strategy set of the second player contains only one strategy, that we call A. The gain
functions are
g1(x,A) = y − x and g2(x,A) = z + ⌊kx⌋.
Definition 2.2. The altruism function aij is the function aij : R
+ × N × Z → N such
that aij(k, y, z) would be the offer of player i to player j if i were the proposer and j
were the responder in Dict(k, y, z).
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Definition of the fairness functions. To capture perception of money, we assume
that to each player i ∈ P is associated a function fi : {(x, y) ∈ R
2 : x ≥ y} → [0,∞)
whose role is to quantify how much player i disappreciates to renounce to a gain of x
and accept a gain of y. The following are then natural requirements:
• fi is continuous,
• if x > y, then fi(x, y) > 0,
• if x = y, then fi(x, y) = 0,
• for any fixed x > 0, the function fi(x, ·) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex
for positive y’s and strictly concave for negative y’s,
• for any fixed y, the function fi(·, y) is strictly increasing and strictly concave for
positive x’s and strictly convex for negative x’s.
The last two properties formalize the well-known diminishing sensitivity principle
[Ka-Tv79]: the same difference of gains (resp. losses) is perceived smaller if the gains
(resp. losses) are higher. Indeed, one possible way to define the functions fi is to use
Kahneman-Tversky’s value function v and set fi(x, y) = v(x) − v(y). The problem of
this definition is that it does not take into account that different players may have dif-
ferent perception of the same amount of money (think of the perception of 100 dollars
of a very rich person and a very poor person).
Therefore, we are led to study the following object.
Definition 2.3. A finite game in explicit form G = G(P, S, g, g, a, f) is given by the
following data:
• a finite set of players P = {1, 2, . . . , N};
• for each player i ∈ P , a finite set of strategies Si;
• a good g, which plays the role of a unit of measurement;
• for each player i ∈ P , a function gi : S1 × . . .× SN → Z, called gain function;
• for each pair of players (i, j), i 6= j, an altruism function aij ;
• For each player i ∈ P , a fairness function fi : {(x, y) ∈ R
2 : x ≥ y} → R
verifying the properties above.
The terminology explicit puts in evidence the fact that we must take into account
explicitly all parameters that are usually considered implicit in the definition of utility
functions. We are not saying that there are only three such parameters (altruism func-
tions, fairness functions, and risk aversion) and this is indeed the first of a long series of
points of the theory deserving more attention in future researches. In particular, there
is some evidence that badness parameters can play an important role in some games.
We shall elaborate on this in Section 10.
The purpose of the paper is to define a solution concept for games in explicit form
taking into account altruism and cooperation and using cumulative prospect theory
instead of expected utility theory. Nevertheless, we will see that
• in most cases the use of cumulative prospect theory instead of expected utility
theory can change predictions only quantitatively and not qualitatively;
• in most cases the altruism functions do not play any active role, since there are
no players having a strategy which give a certain disadvantage to other players.
Consequently, we prefer to introduce the cooperative equilibrium in two steps. In the
first one we keep expected utility theory and we do not use the altruism functions. The
aim of the first step is only to formalize the principle of cooperation. We show that
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already this cooperative equilibrium under expected utility theory and without altruism
can explain experimental data satisfactorily well. In Section 6 we discuss some examples
where the cooperative equilibrium under expected utility theory does not perform well
because of the use of expected utility theory and because we did not take into account
altruism and so we move towards the definition of the cooperative equilibrium under
cumulative prospect theory and taking into account altruism.
3. An informal sketch of the definition
In this section we describe the cooperative equilibrium (under expected utility theory
and without taking into account altruism) starting from an example. The idea is indeed
very simple, even though the complete formalization requires a number of preliminary
definitions that will be given in the next section.
Consider the following variant of the Traveler’s dilemma. Two players have the same
strategy set S1 = S2 = {180, 181, . . . , 300}. The gain functions are
g1(x, y) =
 x+ 5, if x < yx, if x = y
y − 5, if x > y,
and g2(x, y) =
 y + 5, if x > yy, if x = y
x− 5, if x < y.
The usual backward induction implies that (180, 180) is the unique Nash equilib-
rium. Nevertheless, numerous experimental studies reject this prediction and show that
humans play significantly larger strategies.
In the cooperative equilibrium, we formalize the idea that players forecast how the
game would be played if they formed coalitions and then they play according to their
best forecast.
Let us try to describe how this idea will be formalized. In a two-player game, as the
Traveler’s dilemma, there are only two possible coalition structures, the selfish coalition
structure ps = ({1}, {2}) and the cooperative coalition structure pc = ({1, 2}). Let us
analyze them:
• If agents play according to the selfish coalition structure, then by definition they
do not have any incentive to cooperate and therefore they would play the Nash
equilibrium (180, 180). A Nash equilibrium is, by definition, stable, in the sense
that no players have any incentives to change strategy. Consequently, both
players would get 180 for sure. In this case we say that the value of the selfish
coalition structure is 180 and we write v(ps) = 180.
• Now, let us analyze the cooperative coalition structure pc. The largest gain for
each of the two agents, if they play together, is to get 300, that is attained
by the profile of strategies (300, 300). Nevertheless, each player knows that
the other player may defect and play a smaller strategy and so the value of
the cooperative coalition is not 300, but we have to take into account possible
deviations. Let us look at the problem from the point of view of player 1. The
other player, player 2, may deviate and play the strategy 299 or the strategy
298, or the strategy 297, or the strategy 296, or the strategy 295 (indeed, all
these strategies give at least the same gain as the strategy 300, if the first player
is believed to play the strategy 300). In this case, the best that player 2 can
obtain is 304 (if she plays 299 and the first player plays 300) and so we say
that the incentive to deviate from the coalition is 304 − 300 = 4. We denote
this number by D2(pc). Now, if player 2 decides to deviate from the coalition,
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she or he incurs in a risk due to the fact that also player 1 can deviate from
the coalition either to follow selfish interest or because player 1 is clever enough
to understand that player 2 can deviate from the coalition and then player 1
decides to anticipate this move. The maximal risk that player 2 incurs trying
to achieve her maximal gain is then attained when player 2 deviates to 299 and
player 1 anticipates this deviation and play 298. In this case, player 2 would
gain g2(298, 299) = 293. So we say that the risk in deviating from the coalition
structure pc is R2(pc) = 300 − 293 = 7. We now interpret the number
τ1,{2}(pc) =
D2(pc)
D2(pc) +R2(pc)
=
4
11
,
as a sort of prior probability that player 1 assigns to the event “player 2 abandons
the coalition structure pc”. Consequently, we obtain also a number
τ1,∅(pc) = 1− τ1,{2}(pc),
which is interpreted as a prior probability that player 1 assigns to the event
“nobody abandons the coalition structure pc”.
This probability measure will be now used to weight the numbers e1,∅(pc),
representing the infimum of gains that player 1 receives if nobody abandons the
coalition, and e1,{2}(pc), representing the infimum of gains that player 1 receives
if the second player abandons the coalition. Therefore, one has
e1,∅(pc) = 300 and e1,{2}(pc) = 290,
where the second number comes from the fact that the worst that can happen
for player 1 if the second player abandons the coalition and the first players
does not abandon the coalition is in correspondence of the profile of strategies
(300, 295) which gives a gain 290 to the first player. Taking the average we
obtain the value of the cooperative coalition for player 1
v1(pc) = 300 ·
7
11
+ 290 ·
4
11
∼ 296.35.
By symmetry one has v2(ps) = v1(ps) =: v(ps) = 180 and v2(pc) = v1(pc) =: v(pc) =
296.35. So one has v(ps) < v(pc) and then the cooperative equilibrium predicts that
the agents play according to the cooperative coalition structure, since it gives a better
forecast. The meaning of the word play according to pc has to be clarified. Indeed, since
the profile (300, 300) is not stable, we cannot expect that the players play for sure the
strategy 300. What we do is to interpret the values vi(pc) as a sort of common beliefs:
players simply keep only the profiles of strategies σ = (σ1, σ2) such that g1(σ) ≥ v1(pc)
and g2(σ) ≥ v2(pc). Computing the Nash equilibrium in this induced game will give
the cooperative equilibrium of the game that, in this case, is a mixed strategy which
is supported between 296 and 297. Observe that this is very close to the experimental
data. Indeed, the one-shot version of this game was experimented by Goeree and Holt
who reported that 80 per cent of subjects played a strategy between 290 and 300 with
an average of 295 (see [Go-Ho01]).
The purpose of the next section is to formalize the idea that we have just described.
Indeed, even though the idea is very simple and in many relevant cases computations
can be easily performed by hand (cf. Section 5), the correct formalization requires the
whole section 4 because of the following technical problems:
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• In the particular example that we have just described, the cooperative coalition
structure leads to a one-player game with a unique Nash equilibrium, which is
(300, 300). In general this will not happen and we should take into account that
one Nash equilibrium can be less fair than another. For instance, the cooperative
coalition structure in Nash bargaining problem leads to a one-player game with
many Nash equilibria, but intuitively only the (50,50) solution is fair.
• The definition of deviation and risk is intuitively very simple, but the general
mathematical formalization is not straightforward.
4. The cooperative equilibrium under expected utility theory
Let G = G(P, S, g, g, a, f) be a finite4 game in explicit form. As usual, to make nota-
tion lighter, we denote S−i the cartesian product of all the Sj ’s but Si. Let P(X) be the
set of probability measures on the finite setX. If σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ) ∈ P(S1)×. . .×P(SN ),
we denote by σ−i the (N−1)-dimensional vector of measures (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σN )
and, as usual in expected utility theory, we set
gj(σi, σ−i) = gj(σ) :=
∑
(s1,...,sN )∈S
gj(s1, . . . , sN )σ1(s1) · . . . · σN (sN ).
Conversely, if σi ∈ P(Si), for all i ∈ P , the notation gj(σi, σ−i) simply stands for the
number gj(σ1, . . . , σN ).
The main idea behind our definition is the principle of cooperation, that is, players
try to forecast how the game would be played if they formed coalitions and then they
play according to their best forecast. Borrowing a well known terminology from the
literature on coalition formation (cf. [Ra08]), we give the following definition.
Definition 4.1. A coalition structure is a partition p = (p1, . . . , pk) of the player set
P ; that is, the pα’s are subsets of P such that pα∩ pβ = ∅, for all α 6= β, and
⋃
pα = P .
As mentioned in the Introduction, the idea is that each player i ∈ P assigns a value
to each coalition structure p and then plays according to the coalition structure with
highest value. As described in Section 3, the idea to define the value of a coalition
structure p for player i is to take an average of the following kind. Suppose that for all
J ⊆ P \ {i} we have defined a number τi,J(p) describing the probability that players
in J abandon the coalition structure p and a number ei,J(p) describing the infimum of
possible gains of player i when players in J abandon the coalition structure p. Then we
(would) define
vi(p) =
∑
J⊆P\{i}
ei,J(p)τi,J(p). (1)
Our aim is to give a reasonable definition for the numbers ei,J(p) and τi,J(p) under
the assumption that players do not know each other and are not allowed to exchange
information. Of course, this is only a real restriction of the theory: if the players
know each other and/or are allowed to exchange information, this will reflect on the
computation of the probability τi,J(p).
4It is well known that the study of infinite games can be very subtle. For instance, there is large
consensus that, at least when the strategy sets do not have a natural structure of a standard Borel
space, one must allow also purely finitely additive probability measures as mixed strategies, lead-
ing to the problem that even the mixed extension of the utility functions is not uniquely defined
[Ma97],[St05],[Ca-Mo12],[Ca-Sc12]. In this first stage of the research we want to avoid all these technical
issues and we focuse our attention only to finite games.
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Before defining the numbers ei,J(p) and τi,J(p), we need to understand what kind
of strategies agree with the coalition structure p. Indeed, as mentioned in Section 3,
if p 6= ({1}, . . . , {N}) is not the selfish coalition structure, some profiles of strategies
might not be acceptable by the players in the same coalition because they do not share
the gain in a fair way among the players belonging to the same coalition pα. We can
define a notion of fairness making use of the fairness functions fi. First observe that the
hypothesis of working with gain functions expressed using the same unit of measurement
for all players allows us to sum the gains of different players and, consequently, we can
say that a coalition structure p = (p1, . . . , pk) generates a game with k players as follows.
The players are the sets pα in the partition, the pure strategy set of pα is
∏
i∈pα
Si, and
the gain function of player pα is
gpα(s1, . . . , sN ) =
∑
i∈pα
gi(s1, . . . , sN ) (2)
This game, that we denote by Gp, has a non-empty set of Nash equilibria
5 that we
denote by Nash(Gp). Since the players in the same pα are ideally cooperating, not all
Nash equilibria are acceptable, but only the ones that distribute the gain of the coalition
pα as fairly as possible among the players belonging to pα.
To define the subset of fair of acceptable equilibria, fix i ∈ P and consider the
restricted function gi = gi|Nash(Gp) : Nash(Gp) → R. Since Nash(Gp) is compact and gi
is continuous, we can find σi ∈ Nash(Gp) maximizing gi.
Definition 4.2. The disagreement in playing the profile of strategy σ ∈ Nash(Gp) for
the coalition pα is the number
Dispα(σ) =
∑
i∈pα
fi(gi(σi), gi(σ))
Recalling that the number fi(x, y) represents how much player i disappreciates to
renounce to a gain of x and accept a gain of y ≤ x, we obtain that, in to order to have
a fair distribution of the gain among the players in the coalition pα, the disagreement
Dispα must be minimized.
Definition 4.3. The Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Nash(Gp) is acceptable or fair for the coali-
tion pα, if σ minimizes Dispα(σ).
Since the set of Nash equilibria of a finite game is compact and since the functions fi
are continuous, it follows that the set of acceptable equilibria is non-empty and compact.
Let us say explicitly that this is the unique point where we use the functions fi. It
follows, that, for a game G such that every game Gp has a unique Nash equilibrium, the
cooperative equilibrium does not depend on the functions fi.
The importance of the hypotheses about strict convexity in the second variable and
strict concavity in the first variable of the functions fi should be now clear and is
however described in the first of the following series of examples.
Example 4.4. Consider a finite version of Nash’s bargaining problem [Na50b] where
two persons have the same strategy set S1 = S2 = S = {0, 1, . . . , 100} and the gain
functions are as follows:
5If p = (P ) is the grand coalition, then Gp is a one-player game, whose Nash equilibria are all probability
measures supported on the set of strategies maximizing the gain function.
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g1(x, y) =
{
x, if x+ y ≤ 100
0, if x+ y > 100,
and g2(x, y) =
{
y, if x+ y ≤ 100
0, if x+ y > 100.
As well known, this game has attracted attention from game theorists since, despite hav-
ing many pure Nash equilibria, only one is intuitively natural. Indeed, many papers have
been devoted to select this natural equilibrium adding axioms (see [Na50b], [Ka-Sm75],
and [Ka77]) or using different solution concepts (see [Ha-Ro10] and [Ha-Pa12]).
Assume that the two players have the same perception of money, that is f1 = f2 =: f .
Consider the cooperative coalition pc = ({1, 2}) describing cooperation between the
two players. The game Gpc is a one-player game whose Nash equilibria are all pairs
(x, 100−x), x ∈ S1, and all probability measures on S1×S2 supported on such pairs of
strategies. Despite having all these Nash equilibria, the unique acceptable equilibrium
for the game coalition is (50, 50). Indeed, one has
Dispc (50, 50) = f (100, 50) + f (100, 50)
= f
(
100,
1
2
· 100 +
1
2
· 0
)
+ f
(
100,
1
2
· 100 +
1
2
· 0
)
<
1
2
f(100, 100) +
1
2
f(100, 0) +
1
2
f(100, 100) +
1
2
f(100, 0)
= f(100, 100) + f(100, 0)
= Dispc(100, 0).
Analogously, one gets Dispc (50, 50) < Dispc((x, 100 − x)), for all x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 100},
x 6= 50. Consequently, (50, 50) is the unique acceptable equilibrium for the cooperative
coalition pc.
Now let ps = ({1}, {2}) be the selfish coalition structure. Then the unique acceptable
equilibrium for player 1 is (100, 0) and the unique acceptable Nash equilibria for player
2 is (0, 100).
Example 4.5. As second example, we consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma. As well known,
this famous game was originally introduced by Flood in [Fl52], where he reported on a
series of experiments, one of which, now known as Prisoner’s Dilemma, was conducted
in 1950. Even though Flood’s report is seriously questionable, as also observed by Nash
himself (cf. [Fl52], pp. 24-25), it probably represents the first evidence that humans
tend to cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This evidence has been confirmed in
[Co-DJ-Fo-Ro96], where the authors observed a non-negligible percentage of cooperation
even in one-shot version of the Prisoner’s dilemma.
Here we consider a parametrized version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as follows. Two
persons have the same strategy set S1 = S2 = {C,D}, where C stands for cooperate and
D stands for defect. Let µ > 0, denote by G(µ) the game described by the following
gains:
C D
C 1 + µ, 1 + µ 0, 2 + µ
D 2 + µ, 0 1, 1
Therefore, the parameter µ plays the role of a reward for cooperating. The intuition,
motivated by similar experiments conducted on the Traveler’s Dilemma (cf. Example
4.6) or on the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma [DRFN08], suggests that humans should
play the selfish strategy D for very small values of µ and tend to cooperate for very
large values of µ. This intuition is in fact so natural that Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber,
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motivated by experimental results on the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma, asked “How do
the strategies used vary with the gains to cooperation?” (cf. [Fu-Ra-Dr12], p.727, Ques-
tion 4). We will propose an answer to this question (for one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma)
in Example 5.2, where we will show that the cooperative equilibrium predicts a rate of
cooperation depending on the particular gains and that such equilibrium is computable
by a very simple formula (cf. Proposition 5.3). For now, let us just compute the ac-
ceptable Nash equilibria for the two partitions of P = {1, 2}. Let pc = ({1, 2}) be the
cooperative coalition structure, describing cooperation between the players. In this case
we obtain a one-player game with gains:
gpc(C,C) = 2 + 2µ gpc(C,D) = 2 + µ gpc(D,C) = 2 + µ gpc(D,D) = 2.
whose unique Nash equilibrium (i.e., the profile of strategies maximizing the payoff)
is the cooperative profile of strategies (C,C). Uniqueness implies that this equilibrium
must be acceptable independently of the fi’s. On the other hand, the selfish coalition
structure ps = ({1}, {2}) generates the original game, whose unique equilibrium is,
as well known, the defecting profile of strategies (D,D). Also in this case, uniqueness
implies that this equilibrium must be acceptable.
Example 4.6. Finally, we consider the Traveler’s Dilemma. This game was introduced
by Basu in [Ba94] with the purpose to construct a game where Nash equilibrium makes
unreasonable predictions. Basu’s intuition was indeed confirmed by experiments on
both one-shot and repeated treatments [Ca-Go-Go-Ho99], [Go-Ho01], [Be-Ca-Na05],
[Ba-Be-St11]. Fix a parameter b ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 180}, two players have the same strategy
set S1 = S2 = {180, 181, . . . , 300} and payoffs:
g1(x, y) =
 x+ b, if x < yx, if x = y
y − b, if x > y,
and g2(x, y) =
 y + b, if x > yy, if x = y
x− b, if x < y.
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is (180, 180). Nevertheless, it has been
observed that humans tend to cooperate (i.e. play strategies close to (300, 300)) for
small values of b and tend to be selfish (i.e., play strategies close to the Nash equilibrium
(180, 180)) for large values of b. This is indeed what the cooperative equilibrium predicts,
as we will see in Example 5.1. For now, let us just compute the sets of acceptable
equilibria for all partitions of P = {1, 2}. Let pc = ({1, 2}) be the cooperative coalition
structure, describing cooperation between the players. In this case we obtain a one-
player game whose unique Nash equilibrium is attained by the cooperative profile of
strategies (300, 300). Uniqueness implies that this equilibrium must be acceptable. On
the other hand, the selfish coalition structure ps = ({1}, {2}) gives rise to the unique
Nash equilibrium of the game, which is (180, 180). Also in this case, uniqueness implies
that this equilibrium must be acceptable.
Coming back to the description of the theory, we have gotten, for all partitions p
of the player set P and for all sets pα of the partition, a (compact) set of acceptable
equilibria Accpα(Gp) for the coalition pα inside the coalition structure p. Now we define
the numbers ei,J(p) and τJ(p).
Definition of the numbers τi,J(p). We recall that the number τi,J(p) represents
the probability that players i assigns to the event “players in J abandon the coalition
structure p”. Consequently, it is enough to define the numbers τi,J(p) when J = {j}
contains only one element. The other numbers can be indeed reconstructed assuming
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that the events “player j deviates from p” and “player k deviates from p” are inde-
pendent. This assumption is natural in this context where players are not allowed to
exchange information.
Therefore, fix j ∈ P , with j 6= i. The definition of τi,j(p) is intuitively very simple.
It will be a ratio
τi,j(p) =
Dj(p)
Dj(p) +Rj(p)
,
where:
• the number Dj(p) represents the incentive for player j to abandon the coalition
structure p, that is, the maximal gain that player j can get leaving the coalition;
• the number Rj(p) represents the risk that player j takes leaving the coalition
structure p, that is, the maximal loss that player j can incur trying to achieve
her maximal gain, assuming that also other players can abandon the coalition
either to follow selfish interests or to anticipate player j’s defection.
To make this intuition formal, first define
M˜(pα, p) := {σ ∈ Accpα(Gp) : gpα(σ) is maximal} . (3)
The idea is indeed that players in the same coalition try to achieve their maximal
joint gain but, doing that, there might be some conflicts among coalitions. Therefore, we
are interested to look at the strategy profiles that can be constructed putting together
pieces of strategies in the various M˜(pα, p).
To this end, let us fix a piece of notation. For a given player j, let pij : P(S1) ×
. . . × P(SN ) → P(Sj) be the canonical projection. We may reconstruct an element
σ ∈ P(S1)×. . .×P(SN ), through its projections and we write formally σ =
⊗N
j=1 pij(σ).
Set
M(pα, p) :=
⊗
i∈pα
pii(σ) : σ ∈ M˜(pα, p)
 , (4)
and then
M(p) =
k⊗
α=1
M(pα, p). (5)
In words,M(p) is the set of strategy profiles that can be constructed putting together
pieces of acceptable equilibria maximizing the joint gain of each coalition.
Remark 4.7. It is worth mentioning that in many relevant cases all sets M˜(pα, p) con-
tain only one element and the computations get very simple and unambiguous. However,
in some cases, as in the route choice game, this set may contain multiple and theoreti-
cally even infinite elements. From a mathematical point of view, this is not a problem,
since we need only compactness of the sets M˜(pα, p) and these sets are indeed compact.
However, in some cases there might be a natural way to restrict the sets M˜(pα, p), lead-
ing to a computationally lighter and intuitively more natural definition. For instance, in
games with particular symmetries, as the basic route choice game6, players are tipically
indifferent among all pure Nash equilibria maximizing their gains and, therefore, it is
natural to restrict the set M˜(pα, p) and take only its barycenter, which is, in this case,
6There are 2N players, each of which has to decide the route to go to work between two equivalent
routes.
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the uniform measure7. Theoretically, this construction may be extended to every game,
since M˜(pα, p) is always compact and so it has a barycenter (see [Ha-Va89], Sec. 3.b).
But we do not think that the assumption that players in the same pα are indifferent
among all the acceptable strategies which maximize their joint gain is very general and
it would not probably make sense in very asymmetric games. How to restrict the sets
M˜(pα, p) is another point of the theory that deserves particular attention in a future
research.
Definition 4.8. Let σ ∈ P(S1) × . . . × P(SN ) be a profile of mixed strategies and
σ′k ∈ P(Sk). We say that σ
′
k is a k-deviation from σ if gk(σ
′
k, σ−k) ≥ gk(σ).
Now we can finally move towards the definition of incentive and risk. We recall, that
we have fixed a coalition structure p and two players i, j ∈ P , with i 6= j and we want to
define the incentive and risk for player j to abandon the coalition structure. Let Devj(p)
denote the set strategies of player j that are j-deviation from at least one strategy in
M(p).
Definition 4.9. The incentive for player j to deviate from the coalition structure p is
Dj(p) := max
{
gj(σ
′
j , σ−j)− gj(σ) : (σ, σ
′
j) ∈ Devj(p)
}
. (6)
Observe that Dj(p) is attained since the set Devj(p) is compact.
If Dj(p) = 0, then j does not gain anything by leaving the coalition and therefore j
does not have any incentives to abandon the coalition structure p. If it is the case, we
simply define τi,j(p) = 0.
Consider now the more interesting case Dj(p) > 0, where player j has an actual
incentive to deviate from the coalition structure p. If j decides to leave p, it may happen
that she loses part of her gain if other players decide to abandon p either to follow selfish
interests or to answer player j’s defection. To quantify this risk, we first introduce some
notation. Let (σ, σ′j) ∈ Devj(p) such that Dj(p) is attained. Call T (σ, σ
′
j) the set of
σ′−j ∈
⊗
i 6=j P(Si) such that
• gj(σ)− gj(σ
′
j , σ
′
−j) > 0,
• there is k ∈ P \{j} such that pik(σ
′
−j) is a k-deviation from either σ or (σ−j, σ
′
j).
Thus we quantify the risk by
Rj(p) := sup
{
gj(σ)− gj(σ
′
j , σ
′
−j)
}
, (7)
where the supremum is taken over all
(A) (σ, σ′j) ∈ Devj(p) such that Dj(p) is attained,
(B) σ′−j ∈ T (σ, σ
′
j).
The requirement (A) is motivated by the fact that if player j believes that she can leave
the coalition structure p to follow selfish interests, then she must take into account
that also other players may deviate from p either to follow selfish interests or because
they are clever enough to anticipate player j’s defection. This can obstruct player j’s
deviation, if another player’s deviation causes a loss to player j.
Definition 4.10. The prior probability that player j deviates from the coalition struc-
ture p is
τi,j(p) :=
Dj(p)
Dj(p) +Rj(p)
.
7It was reported in [RKDG09] that players tend to play uniformly in the basic route choice game.
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The terminology prior wants to clarify the fact that the event “player j abandons
the coalition” is not measureable in any absolute and meaningful sense. The prior
probability is a sort of measure a priori of this event knowing only mathematically
measurable information, as monetary incentive and monetary risk.
Remark 4.11. If the set T (σ, σ′j) is empty for all (σ, σ
′
j) ∈ Devj(p), then the supremum
defining the risk Rj(p) is equal to zero. Consequently, the prior probability that player
j abandons the coalition structure p is equal to 1. This is coherent with the intuition
that if T (σ, σ′j) = ∅, then there is no way to obstruct player j’s defection.
As said before, we can now compute all remaining probabilities τi,J(p) assuming that
the events “player j deviates from p” and “player k deviates from p” are independent.
In particular, τi,∅(p) will represent the probability that none of the players other than i
deviates from the coalition structure.
Definition of the numbers ei,J(p). We recall that the numbers ei,J(p) represent the
infimum of gains of player i when the players in J decide to deviate from the coalition
structure p. Therefore, the definition of these numbers is very straightforward. Let
J ⊆ P \ {i}, we first define the set
DevJ(p) :=
(σ, σ′J ) ∈
k⊗
α=1
M(pα, p)×
⊗
j∈J
P(Sj) : ∃j ∈ J : gj(pij(σ
′
J), σ−j) ≥ gj(σ)
 .
Then we define
ei,J(p) := inf{gi(σ
′
J , σ−J) : (σ, σ
′
J ) ∈ DevJ(p)}.
Definition 4.12. The value of the coalition structure p for player i is
vi(p) =
∑
J⊆P\{i}
ei,J(p)τi,J(p). (8)
We stress that at this first stage of the research we cannot say that this formula is
eventually the right way to compute the value of a coalition structure. It just seems
a fairly natural way and, as we will show in Section 5, it meets experimental data
satisfactorily well. However, it is likely that a future research, possibly supported by
suitable experiments, will suggest to use of a different formula. For instance, we will
describe in Example ?? that it is possible that the deviation Dj(p) should be computed
taking into account not only deviation to achieve higher gains, but also to get a safe
gain.
Now, in an exact theory, player i is assumed to have unbounded rationality and
is assumed not to make mistakes in the computations and so, using the principle of
cooperation, she will play according to some p which maximises the value function vi.
It remains to understand the meaning of playing according with a coalition structure p.
Indeed, we cannot expect that player i will play surely according to an acceptable Nash
equilibrium of Gp, since she knows that other players may deviate from the coalition.
What we can do is to use the numbers vi(p) to define a sort of beliefs.
Definition 4.13. Let A ⊆ P(S1) × . . . × P(SN ). The subgame induced by A is the
game whose set of mixed strategies of player i is the closed convex hull in P(Si) of the
projection set pii(A).
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Therefore, a subgame induced by a set A is not, strictly speaking, a game, since
in general the set of mixed strategies of player i cannot be described as the convex
hull of a set of pure strategies which is a subset of Si. In the induced game only
particular mixed strategies are allowed, which, as said earlier, correspond to some sort
of beliefs. Observe that, since the set of allowed mixed strategies is convex and compact,
we can formally find a Nash equilibrium of an induced game. Indeed, Nash’s proof of
existence of equilibria does not really use the fact that the utility functions are defined
on P(S1)× . . .×P(SN ), but only that they are defined on a convex and compact subset
of P(S1)× . . .× P(SN ).
Let Ind(G, p) be the subgame induced by the set of strategies σ ∈ P(S1)× . . .×P(SN )
such that gi(σ) ≥ vi(p), for all i ∈ P . Observe that the induced game is not empty,
since vi(p) is a convex combinations of infima of values attained by the gain function gi.
Definition 4.14. (Exact cooperative equilibrium) An exact cooperative equilib-
rium is one where player i plays a Nash equilibrium of the subgame Ind(G, p) where p
maximizes vi(p)
8.
One could define a quantal cooperative equilibrium, declaring that player i plays
with probability eλvi(p)/
∑
p e
λvi(p) according to the quantal response equilibrium or the
quantal level-k theory applied to Ind(G, p). At this first stage of the research, we are
not interesting in such refinements, that could be useful in future and deeper analysis
(cf. Examples ?? and 9.8).
5. Examples and experimental evidence
In this section we apply the cooperative equilibrium (under expected utility theory
and without using altruism) to some well known games. The results we obtain are en-
couraging, since the predictions of the cooperative equilibrium are always satisfactorily
close to the experimental data. We present also two examples where the coopera-
tive equilibrium makes new predictions, completely different from all standard theories.
These new predictions are partially supported by experimental data, but we do not have
enough precise data to say that they are strongly confirmed.
Example 5.1. Let G(b) be the parametrized Traveler’s Dilemma in Example 4.6 with
bonus-penalty equal to b. Let pc = ({1, 2}) be the cooperative coalition. We recall that
in Example 4.6 we have shown that the profile of strategies (300, 300) is the unique
acceptable equilibrium for pc. To compute the values of pc, let i = 1 (the case i = 2 is
the same, by symmetry). One has D2(pc) = b− 1, corresponding to the strategy profile
(300, 299). Corresponding to this deviation of player 2, which is the unique deviation
maximizing player 2’s gain, the best deviation for player 1 is to play the strategy 298,
which gives g2(300, 300)−g2(298, 299) = 2+b. Therefore, R2(pc) = 2+b. Consequently,
we have
τ1,{2}(pc) =
b− 1
2b+ 1
and τ1,∅(pc) =
b+ 2
2b+ 1
.
Now, e1,{2} = 300 − 2b, corresponding to the profile of strategy (300, 300 − b), and
e1,∅(pc) = 300. Consequently, setting v1(pc) = v2(pc) =: v(pc), we have
v(pc) = 300 ·
b+ 2
2b+ 1
+ (300 − 2b) ·
b− 1
2b+ 1
.
8Observe that this is well defined also in case of multiple p’s maximizing vi(p), since the induced games
Ind(G, p) and Ind(G, p′) are the same, if p, p′ are both maximizers.
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On the other hand, the selfish coalition structure ps = ({1}, {2}) has value
v1(ps) = v2(ps) = 180,
since there are no possible deviations from a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, for small
values of b, one has v(pc) > v(ps) and the cooperative equilibrium predicts that agents
play according to the cooperative coalition; for large values of b, one has v(ps) > v(pc)
and then the cooperative equilibrium predicts that agents play the Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, the rate of cooperation depends on b: the larger is b, the smaller is the
rate of cooperation predicted. We are aware of only two experimental studies devoted
to one-shot Traveler’s dilemma. In this cases, the predictions are even quantitatively
close.
• For b = 2 and S1 = S2 = {2, 3, . . . , 100}, it has been reported in [Be-Ca-Na05]
that most of subjects (38 out of 45) chose a number between 90 and 100 and
the strategy which had the highest payoff was s = 97. In our case, we obtain
v(pc) = 100 ·
b+ 2
2b+ 1
+ 96 ·
b− 1
2b+ 1
= 99.2.
Consequently, the cooperative equilibrium is supported near 99.
• For b = 5 and S1 = S2 = {180, 181, . . . , 300}, it has been reported in [Go-Ho01]
that about 80 per cent of the subjects submitted a strategy between 290 and
300, with an average of 295. In our case, we obtain
v(pc) = 300 ·
b+ 2
2b+ 1
+ 290 ·
b− 1
2b+ 1
= 296.35.
Consequently, the cooperative equilibrium is supported between 296 and 297,
which is very close to the experimental data.
• For b = 180 and S1 = S2 = {180, 181, . . . , 300}, it was reported in [Go-Ho01]
that about 80 per cent of the subjects played the Nash equilibrium 180. In our
case, one easily sees that
v(pc) < v(ps)
Consequently, the cooperative equilibrium reduced to Nash equilibrium and pre-
dicts the solution (180, 180). So the cooperative equilibrium coincides with what
most subjects played.
Example 5.2. We consider the parametrized Prisoner’s dilemma as in Example 4.5.
Observe that all known solution concepts predict either defection for sure or coopera-
tion for sure. Nevertheless, the data collected on the conceptually similar parametrized
Traveler’s dilemma suggest that human behavior in the parametrized Prisoner’s dilemma
should depend on the parameter. This intuition is partially supported by the results
presented in [DRFN08], where the authors reported on experiments conducted on the
repeated Prisoner’s dilemma with punishment and observed that subjects tend to co-
operate more when the cost of cooperating is smaller. Motivated by these experimental
data, Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber indeed asked “How do the strategies used vary with
the gains to cooperation?” (cf. [Fu-Ra-Dr12], p.727, Question 4).
We now show that in fact cooperative equilibrium predicts a rate of cooperation which
depends on the particular gains.
Proposition 5.3. The unique cooperative equilibrium of the parametrized Prisoner’s
dilemma G(µ) is:
• (D,D) if µ ≤ 1,
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•
(
µ−1
µ
C + 1
µ
D, µ−1
µ
C + 1
µ
D
)
.
In particular, the cooperative equilibrium of G(µ) verifies the following appealing property:
(1) It predicts defection for µ = 0,
(2) It moves continuously and monotonically from defection to cooperation, as µ
increases,
(3) It converges to cooperation as µ→∞.
Proof. The cooperative coalition structure pc = ({1, 2}) gives rise to a one-player game
whose unique Nash equilibrium is the cooperative profile (C,C). The value of this
coalition is, for both players,
v1(pc) = v2(pc) = (1 + µ)
(
1−
1
1 + µ
)
= µ.
The selfish partition ps = ({1}, {2}) gives rise to the classical Nash equilibrium (D,D).
The value of ps is then, for both players,
v1(ps) = v2(ps) = 1
Therefore, for µ < 1 one has v1(pc) = v2(pc) < v1(ps) = v2(ps) and therefore the
cooperative equilibrium predicts defection. To compute the cooperative equilibrium for
µ ≥ 1, first we need to find all profiles of strategies (σ1, σ2) such that{
g1(σ1, σ2) ≥ µ
g2(σ1, σ2) ≥ µ
(9)
To this end, set σ1 = λ1a1 + (1− λ1)b1 and σ2 = λ2a2 + (1− λ2)b2. From Equation (9)
one gets {
λ1λ2(1 + µ) + (1− λ1)λ2(2 + µ) + (1 − λ1)(1− λ2) ≥ µ
λ1λ2(1 + µ) + (1− λ2)λ1(2 + µ) + (1 − λ1)(1− λ2) ≥ µ
(10)
To compute the Nash equilibrium restricted to the induced game defined by these strate-
gies is very easy. Indeed, it is clear, by simmetry, that this Nash equilibrium must be
symmetric and so it is enough to find the lowest λ such that (λ, λ) is a solution of (10).
One easily finds λ = µ−1
µ
, as claimed. 
As a specific example of a one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma, we consider the one recently
experimented using MTurk in [DEJR12] with monetary outcomes (expressed in dollars)
T = 0.20, R = 0.15, P = 0.05, S = 0. Fix i = 1. Denote by ps the selfish coalition
structure, where the players are supposed to act separately. Then Gps = G, whose unique
Nash equilibrium is (D,D). Since a Nash equilibrium has no deviations, thenD2(pc) = 0
and consequently v(ps) = 0.05. Now, let pc be the cooperative coalition structure, where
the players are supposed to play together. The game Gpc is a one-player game whose only
Nash equilibrium is (C,C). Now, D2(pc) = 0.05, since the second player can get 0.20
instead of 0.15 if she defects and the first player cooperates, and R2(pc) = 0.10, since
the second player risks to get 0.05 instead of 0.15 if also the other player defects. Finally
e1,∅(pc) = 0.15 and e1,2(pc) = 0. Consequently, v(pc) = 0.10, that is larger than v(ps).
So we need to compute the Nash equilibrium of Ind(G, pc). By symmetry of the game,
this is the same as finding the smallest λ such that 0.15λ2+0.2λ(1−λ)+0.05(1−λ)2 ≥
0.1, that is λ = 12 . Consequenty, the cooperative equilibrium of this variant of the
Prisoner’s dilemma is 12C +
1
2D for both players. Notice that in [DEJR12] it has been
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reported that players cooperated with probability 58 per cent in one treatment and 65
per cent in another treatment and the over-cooperation in the second experiment was
explained in terms of framing effect due to the different ways in which the same game
were presented.
Example 5.4. Let us consider the Bertrand competition. Each of N players simultane-
ously chooses an integer between 2 and 100. The player who chooses the lowest number
gets a dollar amount times the number she bids and the rest of the players get 0. Ties
are split among all players who submit the corresponding bid.
The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is to choose 2. Nevertheless, it has been
reported in [Du-Gn00] that humans tend to choose larger numbers. It was also observed
that the claims tend to get closer to the Nash equilibrium, when the number of players
gets larger.
To compute the value of the cooperative coalition pc = ({1, . . . , N}) we observe that
every player j has incentive Dj(pc) = 49 and risk Rj(pc) = 50. We then obtain
• For N = 2, v1(pc) = v2(pc) = 50 ·
50
99 ,
• For N = 4, one has
v1(pc) = . . . = vN (pc) = 50 ·
(
1− 3 ·
49
99
+ 3 ·
(
49
99
)2
−
(
49
99
)3)
,
• and so forth.
In other words, using the law of total probability, one can easily show that the value
of the cooperative coalition converges to 0 very quickly. Consequently, when N in-
creases, the value decreases and the cooperative equilibrium predicts smaller and smaller
claims. This matches qualitatively what reported in a repeated Bertrand competion in
[Du-Gn00].
Example 5.5. In this example we show that the cooperative equilibrium theory fits
an experiment reported by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler in [KKT86]. Consider the
ultimatum game. A proposer and a responder bargain about the distribution of a surplus
of fixed size that we suppose normalized to ten. The responder’s share is denoted by
s and the proposer’s share by 10− s. The bargaining rules stipulate that the proposer
offers a share s ∈ [0, 10] to the responder. The responder can accept or reject s. In
case of acceptance the proposer receives a monetary payoff 10− s, while the responder
receives s. In case of a rejection both players receive a monetary return of zero.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler conducted the following experiment: 115 subjects,
divided in three classes, were asked to say what would be the minimum offer (between
0 and 10 Canadian dollars) that they would accept, if they were responders. The mean
answers were between 2.00, 2.24 and 2.59 (see [KKT86], Table 2).
Now, cooperative equilibrium theory predicts that the responder would accept any
offer larger than the value of the coalition structure with the largest value. So let us
compute the value for the responder of the two coalition structures ps and pc assuming
that the two players have the same perception of money.
Denote by A and R responder’s actions accept and reject, respectively. As in Nash
bargaining problem, we obtain that the cooperative coalition pc = ({1, 2}) leads to a
one-player game Gpc with the unique acceptable equilibrium (5, A). Therefore, we have
v2(pc) =
5
2
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since the first player can abandon the coalition playing every s < 52 , but she risks to
lose everything if the second player rejects the offer (observe that R is a 2-deviation to
the strategy s = 0). On the other hand, of course, one has v(ps) = 0, corresponding to
the equilibrium (0, R).
Consequently, cooperative equilibrium theory predicts that the responder would ac-
cept any offer larger than 2.5 dollars, which fits the experimental data reported in
[KKT86].
In a very recent and not yet published experiment, Wells and Rand [We-Ra] re-
ported that the average claim of 44 subjects was 10.7 out of 30 monetary units. This
corresponds to 35.6 per cent which is apparently quite larger than what cooperative
equilibrium predicts. However, making the average between the (normalized) results in
[KKT86] and [We-Ra] - 44 subjects claimed an average of 0.356, 43 subjects claimed an
average of 0.259, 37 subjects claimed an average of 0.224, and 35 subjects claimed an
average of 0.200 - one finds an average claim of 0.264, which is in fact very close to the
prediction of the cooperative equilibrium, which is 0.25.
Remark 5.6. The cooperative equilibrium can predict well also other experimental
data collected for the ultimatum game.
Recall that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the ultimatum game is to
offer s = 0. Nevertheless, there are numerous experimental studies which reject this
prediction and show that proposers almost always make substantially larger offers. Fehr
and Schmidt [Fe-Sc99] explained these observations making use of two parameters αi, βi
for each player. Let us find out what happens using cooperative equilibrium.
Concerning the selfish coalition ps = ({1}, {2}). One easily sees that
v1(ps) = v2(ps) = 0,
in correspondence to the subgame perfect equilibrium (0, R). Concerning the coopera-
tive coalition, we have
v1(pc) =
1
2
,
since the second player has no incentive to abandon the coalition, and
v2(pc) =
1
4
,
as shown in Example 5.5. Consequently, the exact cooperative equilibrium predicts
that the proposer offers s = 0.25 and the responder accepts. This explains the fact that
there are virtually no offer below 0.2 and above 0.5, which was observed in [Fe-Sc99] mak-
ing a comparison among experimental data collected in [GSS82], [KKT86], [FHSS88],
[RPOZ91], [Ca95], [HMcS96], and [Sl-Ro97].
So there are some data that can be explained by the cooperative equilibrium under
expected utility theory and without altruism. Other data can be explained using al-
truism. For instance, it was observed that proposer’s offer was very often higher than
0.25 and, in most of the cases, it was between 0.4 and 0.5 (cf. [Fe-Sc99], Table I).
This stronger deviation towards cooperation is not predicted by the exact cooperative
equilibrium without altruism and we will show in Example 8.11 how the cooperative
equilibrium with altruism can explain it.
We now discuss an example that we believe is relevant because it makes predictions
that are significantly different from Nash equilibrium. Such predictions are partially
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confirmed by experimental data, but it would be important to conduct more precise
experiments in order to see how humans behave in such a situation.
Example 5.7. Let us consider the N -player public good game. There are N players,
each of which has to decide on her contribution level xi ∈ [0, y] to the public good. The
monetary payoff of player i is given by
gi(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) = y − xi + α(x1 + x2 + . . . + xN ),
where 1
N
< α < 1 denotes the constant marginal return to the public good X =
x1+x2+ . . .+xN . Notice that the unique perfect equilibrium is to choose xi = 0. Nev-
ertheless, this free ride hypothesis has been rejected by numerous experimental studies
(see, e.g., [Ma-Am81], [Is-Wa88], [IWW94], [Le95]). In particular, it was explicitly re-
ported in [Is-Wa88] and [IWW94] the intuitive fact that, for a fixed number of player,
claims get larger as α get larger and the much less intuitive fact that, for a fixed α,
claims get larger when the number of players is large enough. We now show that the
first property is predicted by the cooperative equilibrium and we anticipate that the
second property is predicted by the cooperative equilibrium under cumulative prospect
theory.
Proposition 5.8. Let N , the number of players, be fixed. Denote v(pc) and v(ps)
respectively the value of the cooperative coalition structure pc = ({1, . . . , N}) and of the
selfish coalition structure ps = ({1}, . . . , {N}). Then the function v(pc)− v(ps) has the
following properties:
(1) it is strictly increasing in the variable α,
(2) it is negative for α = 1
N
,
(3) it is positive for α = 1.
The proof of this proposition is a long and tedious computation. Here we report
explicitly only the proof for N = 2. How to treat the general case should then be clear
(use the law of total probabilities).
Proof of Proposition 5.8 with N = 2. Let pc = ({1, 2}) be the cooperative coalition
structure. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game Gpc is (y, y) and each of the
two players gets e1,∅(pc) = 2αy. Assume i = 1 (the case i = 2 is symmetric). Observe
that D2(pc) = y+αy− 2αy = y−αy. Indeed, the best deviation for player 2 is to play
x2 = 0, which gives a payoff of y+αy, if x1 = y. The risk is R2(pc) = 2αy − y. Indeed,
if also player 1 abandons the coalition pc to play the selfish strategy x1 = 0, player 2
would get y instead of 2αy. Consequently
τ1,{2}(pc) =
y − αy
y − αy + 2αy − y
=
1− α
α
.
On the other hand, one has
e1,{2}(pc) = αy,
corresponding to player 2’s defection. Therefore,
v1(pc) = v2(pc) = 2αy ·
2α− 1
α
+ αy ·
1− α
α
= (3α− 1)y.
On the other hand, the selfish coalition ps = ({1}, {2}) has value y, corresponding to
the equilibrium (0, 0). Consequently, the function v(pc)− v(ps) is strictly increasing in
the variable α and one has
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v(pc) = v(ps) ⇐⇒ α =
2
3
.

As a quantitative comparison, we consider the experimental data reported in [GHL02],
with α = 0.8. We normalize y to be equal to 1 (in the experiment y = 0.04 dollars). In
this case the cooperative equilibrium is supported between 0.66 and 0.67. In [GHL02] it
has been reported that the average of contributions was 0.50, but the mode was 0.60 (6
out of 32 times) followed by 0.80 (5 out of 32 times).
Example 5.9. We consider the finite version of Nash’s bargaining problem as in Ex-
ample 4.4. It is well known that the unique reasonable solution is (50, 50) and indeed a
number of theories has been developed to select such a Nash equilibrium. For instance,
in [Na50b], [Ka-Sm75], and [Ka77], the authors studied a set of additional axioms that
guarantee that the unique solution of Nash bargaining problem is a 50-50 share. Other
solutions, based on different solution concepts, have been recently proposed in [Ha-Ro10]
and [Ha-Pa12].
Now we show that also the cooperative equilibrium predicts a 50-50 share, if the two
players have the same perception of gains.
Proposition 5.10. If the two players have the same perception of money, that is,
f1 = f2, then the unique exact cooperative equilibrium is (50, 50).
Proof. As we have already seen in Example 4.4, the cooperative partition pc has a unique
acceptable profile of strategies, which is (50, 50). Observe that Devj(p) = ∅, for all j,
and therefore Ind(G, p) is the game where both players can choose only the strategy 50.
Consequently, we have
v1(pc) = v2(pc) = 50.
Now consider the selfish coalition structure ps = ({1}, {2}). This time the unique
acceptable equilibria are
Acc{1}(Gps) = (100, 0) Acc{2}(Gps) = (0, 100).
Observing that Dev(ps) = ∅, we then obtain
v1(ps) = g1(100, 100) = 0.
Analogously, we obtain v2(ps) = g2(100, 100) = 0. Therefore the value of the cooper-
ative coalition structure is larger than the value of the selfish coalition structure and,
consequently, the set of exact cooperative equilibria of Nash bargaining problem coin-
cides with the set of Nash equilibria of the induced game Ind(G, pc). Since this induced
game contains only one profile of strategies, which is (50, 50), this is then its unique
exact cooperative equilibrium. 
We mentioned in the Introduction that there are other solution concepts that have
been proposed in the last few years and we have discussed why believe that Renou-
Schlag-Halpern-Pass’s iterated regret minimization is the most promising of them: the
others are either too rigid or inapplicable to one-shot games. Contrariwise, iterated
regret minimization can explain deviations from Nash equilibria in several games. Nev-
ertheless, as observed in [Ha-Pa12], it fails to predict human behavior for some other
games, such as the Prisoner’s dilemma, the public good game, and the Traveler’s
dilemma with punishment. We have already computed the cooperative equilibrium
for the Prisoner’s dilemma and the public good game and we now make a parallelism
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between iterated regret minimization and cooperative equilibrium for the Traveler’s
dilemma with punishment.
Example 5.11. Consider a variant of the Traveler’s dilemma that has been proposed
in [Ha-Pa12], Section 6. Let us start from the Traveler’s dilemma in Example 4.6 where,
this time, the strategy set is {2, 3, . . . , 100} for both players and the bonus-penalty is
b = 2. Suppose that we modify this variant of the Traveler’s dilemma so as to allow
a new action, called P (for punish), where both players get 2 if they both play P, but
if one player plays P and the other plays an action other than P, then the player who
plays P gets 2 and the other player gets −96. In this case (P,P ) is a Nash equilibrium
and it is also the solution in terms of regret minimization. As observed in [Ha-Pa12],
this is a quite unreasonable solution, since the intuition suggests that playing P should
not be rational. In fact, one can easily check that, from our point of view, this game
is absolutely the same as the original Traveler’s dilemma9 and therefore it has got the
same cooperative equilibria.
6. Towards cumulative prospect theory
In the previous section we have discussed a set of examples where the cooperative
equilibrium under expected utility theory predicts human behavior satisfactorily well.
On the other hand, since we are working with gain functions, it is natural to use cu-
mulative prospect theory instead of expected utility theory. But before describing the
cooperative equilibrium under cumulative prospect theory, we discuss a few examples
where the passage from expected utility theory to cumulative prospect theory may
explain observations that are not consistent with the cooperative equilibrium under
expected utility theory.
Example 6.1. We mentioned before that has been observed that contributions in the
Public Goods game depend on the number of players in a puzzling way: they first
decreases as the number of players increases, but then, when the number of players if
sufficiently large, they increase again. This behavior is not predicted by the cooperative
equilibrium under expected utility theory, which predicts that contributions decreases
as the number of players increases. Nevertheless, this behavior is consistent with the
cooperative equilibrium under cumulative prospect theory.
Indeed, given the N -player Public Goods game with marginal return α, the prior
probability that player j abandons the coalition is
τi,j(pc) =
1− α
α(N − 1)
.
Consequently, when N is large enough, all the events “j abandons the coalition” have
negligible probability. Now, one of the principles of cumulative prospect theory is that
decision makers treat extremely unlikely events as impossible (see [Ka-Tv79], p.275)
and therefore, a part from very risk averse people, most of the agents would actually
replace this probability just by 0. So the cooperative equilibrium is consistent with the
tendency to cooperate that has been observed in large groups.
Example 6.2. The following game has been proposed by J. Halpern in a private com-
munication. Two players have the same strategy set {a, b, c} and the gains are described
by the matrix
9Basically because strategies with very small payoff, such as P , do not enter in our computation of the
value of the cooperative coalition.
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a b c
a x, x 0, 0 0, y
b 0, 0 x, x 0, y
c y, 0 y, 0 y, y
where x > y > 0. In this case one finds v(pc) = v(ps) = 0 and consequently, the set
of exact cooperative equilibrium is equal to the set of Nash equilibria. Nevertheless,
in this case it is very likely that if y and x are very close and much larger than 0,
then the two players should coordinate and play the safe strategy c. Also this behavior
would be predicted by the cooperative equilibrium under cumulative prospect theory:
the strategies a and b are deleted a priori since perceived too risky with respect to the
safe strategy.
7. A brief introduction to cumulative prospect theory
The examples described in the previous sections give one more motivation to aban-
don expected utility theory and use cumulative prospect theory. Before starting the
description of the cooperative equilibrium under cumulative prospect theory, we take
this short section to give a short introduction to this theory.
By definition, a prospect p = (x−m, p−m; . . . ;x−1, p−1;x0, p0;x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn) yields
outcomes10 x−m < . . . < x−1 < x0 = 0 < x1 < . . . < xn with probabilities pi > 0, for
i 6= 0, and p0 ≥ 0, that sum up to 1.
Expected utility theory was founded by Morgenstern and von Neumann in [Mo-vN47]
to predict the behavior of a decision maker that must choose a prospect among some.
Under certain axioms (see, for instance, [Fi82]) Morgenstern and von Neumann proved
that a decision maker would evaluate each prospect p using the value
V (p) =
n∑
i=−m
piu(xi), (11)
where u(xi) is the utility of the outcome xi, and then she would choose the prospect(s)
maximizing V (p).
It has been first realized by M. Allais in [Al53] that a human decision maker does
not really follow the axioms of expected utility theory and, in particular, she evaluates
a prospect using an evaluation procedure different from the one in (11). A first attempt
to replace expected utility theory with a theory founded on different axioms and able to
explain deviations from rationality was done in [Ka-Tv79], where Kahneman and Tver-
sky founded the so-called prospect theory. This novel theory encountered two problems.
First, it did not always satisfy stochastic dominance, an assumption that many theorists
were reluctant to give up. Second, it was not readily extendable to prospects with a
large number of outcomes. Both problems could be solved by the rank-dependent or
cumulative functional, first proposed by Quiggin [Qu82] for decision under risk and by
Schmeidler[Sc89] for decision under uncertainty. Finally, Kahneman and Tversky were
able to incorporate the ideas presented in [Qu82] and [Sc89] and developed their cumu-
lative prospect theory in [Tv-Ka92]. Prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory
10Prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory have been originally developed for monetary outcomes
(see [Ka-Tv79], p.274, l.4), giving us one more motivation to abandon utility functions and work with
gain functions. Kahneman and Tversky’s choice to work with monetary outcomes is probably due to
the second principle of their theory, as it will be recalled little later.
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have been successfully applied to explain a large number of phenomena that expected
utility theory was not able to explain, as the disposition effect [Sh-St85], asymmetric
price elasticity [Pu92],[Ha-Jo-Fa93], tax evasion [Dh-No07], as well as many problems
in international relations [Le92], finance [Th05], political science [Le03], among many
others11.
The basic principles of cumulative prospect theory are the following.
(P1) Decision makers weight probabilities in a non linear manner. In particular,
the evidence suggests that decision makers overweight low probabilities and
underweight high probabilities.
(P2) Decision makers think in terms of gains and losses rather than in terms of their
net assets12.
(P3) Decision makers tend to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptance
with respect to losses13.
(P4) Losses loom larger than gains; namely, the aggravation that one experiences in
losing a sum of money appears greater than the pleasure associated with gaining
the same amount of money.
The consequence of these principles is that decision makers evaluate a prospect p
using a value function
V (p) =
n∑
j=−m
pijv(xj) (12)
that is completely different from the one in (11). To understand the explicit shape of
the functions v and pi is probably the most important problem in cumulative prospect
theory. About the function v, it has been originally proposed in [Tv-Ka92] to use the
function
v(x) =
{
xα, if x ≥ 0;
−λ(−x)β, if x < 0.
where experiments done in [Tv-Ka92] gave the estimations α ∼ β ∼ 0.88 and λ ∼ 2.25.
About the function pi, the situation is much more intrigued: cumulative prospect theory
postulates the existence of a strictly increasing surjective function w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such
that
pi−m = w(p−m)
pi−m+1 = w(p−m + p−m+1)−w(p−m)
...
pij = w
(
j∑
i=−m
pi
)
− w
(
j−1∑
i=−m
pi
)
j < 0
pi0 = 0
pij = w
 n∑
i=j
pi
− w
 n∑
i=j+1
pi
 j > 0
11The two papers in prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory have more than 30000 citations.
12This principle is probably the one which forced Kahneman and Tversky to work with monetary
outcomes and force us to work with gain functions.
13As a consequence, risk aversion is already taken into account and this is why we did not need to
consider it explicitly in the definition of a game in explicit form.
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...
pin−1 = w(pn−1 + pn)− w(pn)
pin = w(pn)
A first proposal of such a function w was made by Tversky and Kahneman themselves
in [Tv-Ka92] and it is
w(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)
1
γ
where γ has been estimated to belong to the interval
[
1
2 , 1
)
in [Ri-Wa06]. Other
functions w have been proposed in [Ka79], [Go-Ei87], [R87], [Cu-Sa89], [La-Ba-Wi92],
[Lu-Me-Ch93], [He-Or94], [Pr98], and [Sa-Se98].
It is not our purpose to give too many details about the enormous literature devoted
to understanding the evaluation procedure in cumulative prospect theory. Our purposes
were indeed to give a brief introduction to the theory and stress how this theory implies
the necessity to work with gain functions instead of utility functions. So we now pass
to the description of the cooperative equilibrium for finite games in explicit form under
cumulative prospect theory and taking into account altruism.
8. Iterated Deletion: the set of playable strategies
The cooperative equilibrium under cumulative prospect theory and taking into ac-
count altruism will be defined through two steps. In the first step we use the altruism
functions aij to eliminate the strategies that are not good for the collectivity. The sec-
ond step is the prospect theoretical analogue of the procedure described in Section 4,
applied to the subgame obtained after eliminating the strategies in the first step.
In this section we describe the first step of the construction, that we call iterated
deletion. As well known, iterated deletion of strategies is a procedure which is common
to most solution concepts (in Nash theory, one deletes dominated strategies; in iter-
ated regret minimization theory, one deletes strategies which do not minimize regret;
in Bernheim’s and Pearce’s rationability theory ([Be84] and [Pe84]), one deletes strate-
gies that are not justifiable [Os-Ru94]). However, the use of altruism to delete strategies
seems new in the literature. This iterated deletion of strategies is based on a new notion
of domination between strategies, that we call super-domination14, which is motivated
by the fact that human players do not eliminate weakly or strongly dominated strate-
gies (as shown by the failure of the classical theory to predict human behavior in the
Prisoner’s and Traveler’s Dilemmas).
Each step of our iterated deletion of strategies is made by two sub-reductions. The
first sub-reduction is based on the following principle:
(CS) If si ∈ Si is a strategy for which there is another strategy s
′
i ∈ Si which gives a
certain larger gain (or a certain smaller loss) to player i and does not harm too
much the other players, then player i will prefer the strategy s′i and will never
ever play the strategy si.
Thus, this principle states that every player is selfish unless the society gets a big
damage. As we mentioned before, implicit in this principle there is a new notion of
domination between strategies.
14A slightly stronger notion of domination between strategies has been independenlty introduced in
[Ha-Pa13], under the name minimax domination.
30 VALERIO CAPRARO
Definition 8.1. Let si, s
′
i ∈ Si. We say that si is super-dominated by s
′
i and we write
si <i s
′
i, if
(1) for all s−i, s
′
−i ∈ S−i, one has gi (si, s−i) ≤ gi
(
s′i, s
′
−i
)
,
(2) there are s−i, s
′
−i ∈ S−i such that gi (si, s−i) < gi
(
s′i, s
′
−i
)
.
Observe that super-domination is much stronger than the classical notion of weak
domination. This makes sense since it has been observed that in many situations, as in
the Traveler’s dilemma, players do not eliminate weakly dominated strategies, while it is
clear that a purely selfish player would delete a super-dominated strategy. On the other
hand, there is no direct relation between super-domination and strong-domination, as
shown by the following examples.
Example 8.2. Consider the following version of the Prisoner’s dilemma
L R
U 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
The strategy D strongly dominates U and the strategy R strongly dominates the strategy
L. Nevertheless, there are no super-dominated strategies, since g1(D,R) < g1(U,L) and
g2(D,R) < g2(U,L).
Example 8.3. Consider the two-person zero-sum game
L R
U 0, 0 10,−10
D 1,−1 1,−1
In this case L super-dominates R, but R is not strongly dominated by L, since g2(D,R) =
g2(D,L).
We will see in Example 8.13 that the notion of super-domination between strategies
can be interesting in itself, since it allows to explain some phenomena that are not easy
to capture making use of weakly and strongly dominated strategies.
Before coming back to the theory, we need to fix some terminology. Fix σi ∈ P(Si),
the fiber game defined by σi is the (N − 1)-player game Gσi obtained by G assuming
that player i plays the strategy σi surely. Formally, Gσi = G(P \{i}, S−i, g, gσi , a−i, f−i),
where gσi is the (N−1)-dimensional vector whose components are the functions gj(σi, ·),
with j ∈ P \ {i}, a−i = (ajk)j,k∈P\{i},j 6=k, f−i = (fj)j∈P\{i}. Using a trick which is
conceptually similar to the one used in [Ha-Ro10], we define the cooperative equilibrium
by induction on the number of players.
Definition 8.4. The cooperative equilibria of a one-player game are all probability
measures supported on the set of pure strategies that maximize the gain function and
give rise to acceptable equilibria15.
Now we suppose that we have already defined the cooperative equilibrium for all
(N − 1)-player games and we define the cooperative equilibrium for all N -player games.
We denote by Coop(G) the set of cooperative equilibria of a game G.
Now, fix i ∈ P and let s, t ∈ Si, with s <i t. If player i is believed to play the strategy
t, the other players would answer playing an equilibrium of the fiber game Gt. Since the
15As observed in Remark 4.7, when there are many such equilibria, it might make sense to consider
only the barycenter.
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fiber game has N − 1 players, we may use the inductive hypothesis. We define the set
of losers Li(s, t) to be the set of players j ∈ P such that
(1) gj
(
s, σ
(s)
−i
)
> gj
(
t, σ
(t)
−i
)
, for all σ
(t)
−i ∈ Coop(Gt), σ
(s)
−i ∈ Coop(Gs), and
(2) gj
(
t, σ
(t)
−i
)
< gi
(
t, σ
(t)
−i
)
, for all σ
(t)
−i ∈ Coop(Gt).
In words, Li(s, t) is the set of players that have a certain disadvantage when player i
decides to play the strategy t instead of her worse strategy s (Condition (1)) and that
are weaker than player i when she plays her better strategy s (Condition (2)).
Now, if player i decides to renounce to play t and accept to play s, then she renounce
to a certain gain of inf
{
gi
(
t, σ
(t)
−i
)
: σ
(t)
−i ∈ Coop(Gt)
}
, to accept a smaller gain. Her
maximal loss is then:
Pi(s, t) := sup
{
inf
{
gi
(
t, σ
(t)
−i
)
: σ
(t)
−i ∈ Coop(Gt)
}
− gi
(
s, σ
(s)
−i
)
: σ
(s)
−i ∈ Coop(Gs)
}
.
On the other hand, the best that can happen to player j ∈ Li(s, t) if player i decides
to play her worse strategy s is
Qj(s, t) := sup
{
gj
(
s, σ
(s)
−i
)
− inf
{
gj
(
t, σ
(t)
−i
)
: σt−i ∈ Coop(Gt)
}
: σ−i(s) ∈ CoopGs
}
.
Now, set
P ′i (t) := inf
{
gi
(
t, σ
(t)
−i
)
: σ
(t)
−i ∈ Coop(Gt)
}
.
In words, this number is the certain gain that player i would get if she decides to play
her better strategy t. Now, set
Q′j(s) := inf
{
gj
(
s, σ
(s)
−i
)
: σ
(s)
−i ∈ Coop(Gs)
}
.
In words, this number is the certain gain that player j would get if player i decides to
play her worse s.
Therefore, we have reduced the problem of choosing s or t to the following problem:
does player i accept to renounce to Pi(s, t) out of P
′
i (s, t) in order to give a gain ofQj(s, t)
to player j, who already had a certain gain of Q′j(s, t)? This is in fact a generalized
dictator game. So, we set
Aij(s, t) = aij
(
Qj(s, t)
Pi(s, t)
, P ′i (t), Q
′
j(s)
)
,
and we give the following definition.
Definition 8.5. A strategy s ∈ Si is unplayable of the first type for player i if there is
another strategy t ∈ Si such that
• s <i t
• for all j ∈ Li(s, t), one has Pi(s, t) > Aij(s, t).
In this case we write s <Ii t.
Example 8.6. Consider the game with gain matrix
L R
U 1, 1 1, 1
D 1, 1 2, 1
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Observe that U <1 D. Moreover, L1(U,D) = ∅ and therefore the second condition in
Definition 8.5 is true for trivial reasons. Consequently, the strategy U is unplayable of
the first type for the first player. This happens, roughly speaking, because the column-
player, playing D, can have a gain without damaging the row-player.
Example 8.7. A little less trivial example is given by the game represented by the
following gain matrix
L R
U 0, 0 0, 0
D 1,−1 1,−1
Assume a12(1, 1,−1) < 1. Of course, U <1 D. Now, observe that P1,2(U,D) = 1 and
that A12(s, t) = a12(1, 1,−1), thus the strategy U is unplayable of the first type for the
vertical player. Roughly speaking, this happens because the vertical player, playing D,
will get a certain gain giving a damage to the horizontal player that is small compared
to her gain.
Coming back to the theory, we would like to delete unplayable strategies of the first
type. To this end, we need to prove a simple lemma. Given si ∈ Si, let Maj
I(si) ={
s′i ∈ Si : si <
I
i s
′
i
}
.
Lemma 8.8. For all i ∈ P , there exists si ∈ Si such that Maj
I(si) = ∅.
Proof. By contradiction, let MajI(si) 6= ∅, for all si ∈ Si. Fix s
(1)
i ∈ Si. An iteration of
the property MajI 6= ∅ allows to construct a chain
s
(1)
i <
I
i s
(2)
i <
I
i . . . <
I
i s
(n)
i
By finiteness of the set Si, we may assume that at some point we get s
(n)
i = s
(1)
i , with
s
(n−1)
i 6= s
(1)
i . Observe that the relation <
I
i might not be transitive, but the underlying
relation <i is transitive. Therefore, we have gotten
s
(1)
i <i s
(n−1)
i and s
(n−1)
i <i s
(1)
i
that contradict each other. 
Let UnPl
(1)
i (G) be the set of player i’s unplayable strategies of the first type and
denote by Pl
(1)
i (G) := Si\UnPl
(1)
i (G), that is well defined and non-empty by Lemma 8.8.
The notation Pl
(1)
−i (G) stands for the cartesian product of all the Pl
(1)
j (G)’s but Pl
(1)
i (G).
Now we start the description of the second sub-restriction, that will be done through
the definition of unplayable strategies of the second type. The principle underlying
this second restriction is somehow the dual principle of the one underlying the previous
restriction:
(PA) If s ∈ Si is a strategy for which there is another strategy t ∈ Si such that player
i has a little disadvantage, but the other players have a big advantage, then
player i will prefer the strategy t in order to help the society.
As said earlier, the principle (CS) is a sort of controlled selfishness, whereas the
principle (PA) sounds more like pure altruism. We can formalize it in a similar way as
we formalized (CS). Indeed, we can use the number Pi(s, t) and Aij(s, t) in the dual
way.
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Definition 8.9. A strategy t ∈Pl
(1)
i (G) is called unplayable of the second type for player
i if there is another strategy s ∈ Pl
(1)
i (G) such that
(1) s <i t,
(2) There exists j ∈ Li(s, t) such that Pi(s, t) ≤ Aij(s, t).
Example 8.10. Consider the standard dictator game Dict(1, 10, 0), that is, a proposer
offers a division of 10 dollars, which the responder has to accept. The standard perfect
equilibrium analysis of this games is that the proposer should keep all the money,
since the responder has no say. Nevertheless, in experiments has been reported that
most proposers offer a certain amount of money to the responder (see, for instance,
[Fo-Ho-Sa-Se94]). Bolton and Ockenfels explained this anomalous behavior using equity
in [Bo-Oc00]. We can explain it using iterated deletion of strategies using altruism. Let
us model the set of strategies of the proposer, for simplicity, by S = {0, 1, . . . , 10}. It
is clear that there is a chain of super-dominated strategies for the proposer: 0 <prop
1 <prop 2 <prop . . . <prop 10. Now, one can easily show that every strategy s with
s < aprop,resp(1, 10, 0) is unplayable of the second type for the proposer. Therefore,
cooperative equilibrium theory predicts that the proposer offers a fairer division because
of altruism. Moreover, the larger is aprop,resp(1, 10, 0), the larger is the offer.
Example 8.11. We have seen in Example 5.5 that the cooperative equilibrium without
altruism of the Ultimatum game is that the proposer offers 0.25 and the responder ac-
cepts. Nevertheless, it has been reported that most of proposers actually propose a share
closer to 0.5. This can be explained taking into account altruism. Indeed, if we model
the set of strategies of the proposer using the set S = {0.00, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 1.00}, then
in the induced game Ind(G, pc), the strategy 0.25 is super-dominated for the proposer
by 0.26, which is super-dominated by 0.27 and so forth. As in the previous example,
some of these strategies are unplayable of the second type and therefore, altruism can
explain why offers are tipically larger than 0.25.
Let UnPl
(2)
i (G) be the set of player i’s unplayable strategies of the second type and
denote by Pl
(2)
i (G) :=Pl
(1)
i (G)\UnPl
(2)
i (G). This set is well defined and non-empty thanks
to the obvious analogue of Lemma 8.8.
Now, we start an iteration of this procedure: we consider the subgame G2 of G
defined by the strategy sets Pl
(2)
i (G) and we reduce again these strategy sets computing
the unplayable strategies of the two types; in this way, we get other sets of playable
strategies Pl
(2)
i (G2); and we start again the procedure. By finiteness of the strategy sets
Si, this iteration stabilizes, that is, at some step k, one has have Pl
(2)
i (Gk) =Pl
(2)
i (Gk+1)
and this set is clearly non-empty. We set Pli := Pl
(2)
i (Gk).
Definition 8.12. The set Pli is called set of playable strategies of player i.
Before starting the second step of the construction, that is, the prospect theoretical
analogue of Section 4, we give more details about the game introduced in Example 8.3.
Indeed, this game seems interesting from several viewpoints. First, it is an example
where the procedure of elimination of unplayable strategies stabilizes after more than
one step. Then, it is one more example where iterated regret minimization theory
fails to predict the intuitively right behavior, whereas the cooperative equilibrium does
apparently the right job. Finally, it is an example where super-dominated strategies turn
out to be helpful to modify iterated regret minimization theory allowing prior beliefs
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and consequently obtaining the right prediction also under iterated regret minimization
theory.
Example 8.13. Consider the same two-person zero-sum game as in Example 8.3, that
is, the game with gain matrix
L R
U 0, 0 10,−10
D 1,−1 1,−1
Assume that a12(1, 1,−1) < 1. Observe that L super-dominates R and that L2(R,L) =
∅. Consequently, R is unplayable of the first type. On the other hand, in this first step
U and D are not ordered and therefore, the first step of the iterated deletion leads to the
subgame G2 where the vertical player still has both strategies U and D available, whereas
the horizontal player has only the strategy L. Therefore, in the game G2, the strategy
U is unplayable of the second type for the column-player (since a12(1, 1,−1) < 1) and,
consequently, one more application of deletion of unplayable strategies leads to the triv-
ial game where the vertical player has only the strategy D and the horizontal player
has only the strategy L. Therefore, (D,L) is the unique cooperative equilibrium of this
game. Observe that this is also a Nash equilibrium. The other Nash equilibrium is(
D, 910L+
1
10R
)
, as one can easily check, which is quite unreasonable, since there is no
reason why the horizontal player should play R: playing L she will certainly get at least
the same as playing R. Therefore, the cooperative equilibrium coincides with the most
reasonable Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, a direct application of the iterated regret minimization procedure
predicts that the vertical player plays U surely. This is also quite unreasonable, because
playing U makes sense only if the column-player plays R. This cannot happen, above
all if the column-player understands that the row-player is going to play U. As sug-
gested by Halpern in a private communication, one can fix this problem allowing prior
beliefs, in a conceptually similar way as in [Ha-Pa12], Section 3.5: first one eliminates
weakly dominated strategies, then applies iterated regret minimization. Nevertheless,
this procedure is questionable on one point: it is not clear why one should eliminate
weakly dominated strategies in this context and not in the Traveler’s dilemma16. One
can fix this problem using super-domination. If one eliminates super-dominated strate-
gies in the game under consideration before applying iterated regret minimization, one
finds the right solution (D,L), coherently with the classical theory and the cooperative
equilibrium. Moreover this is perfectly coherent with the other examples discussed in
[Ha-Pa12] and in particular with the Traveler’s dilemma: the Traveler’s dilemma has
many weakly dominated strategies, but none of them is super-dominated.
9. The cooperative equilibrium under cumulative prospect theory
In this section we finally define the cooperative equilibrium for games in explicit form
G = G(P, S, g, g, a, f) in complete generality.
In the previous section we have restricted the sets of pure strategies and we have
defined the sets of playable strategies Pli. We denote by Red(G) this reduced game, that
is, the subgame of G defined by the strategy subsets Pli. The cooperative equilibrium of
G (under prospect theory and taking into account altruism) will be obtained by applying
the construction described in Section 4 to the reduced game Red(G) and making use
16If one eliminates weakly dominates strategies in the Traveler’s dilemma before applying iterated regret
minimization, one obtains the Nash equilibrium.
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of cumulative prospect theory. To this end, notice that the construction presented in
Section 4 depends on expected utility theory only on two points:
(1) We have used expected utility theory to compute the value of the prospect
(ei,J(p), τi,J(p))
indexed by J ⊆ P \ {i}. Using cumulative prospect theory, the value that we
denoted vi(p) should be replaced by its prospect theoretical analogue
vCPTi (p) =
∑
J⊆P\{i}
v(ei,J (p))piτi,J (p). (13)
Since the value v(x) represents how the players perceive a gain of x, also the
definition of the induced game should be modified: indeed we should allow only
the profiles of strategies σ such that v(gi(σ)) ≥ v
CPT
i (p). Consequently, the
two applications of the function v, the first in the computation of vCPTi and the
second in the definition of the induced game, are somehow inverse. Indeed, if
v were linear and increasing, the induced game would have been the same as
the one obtained by setting v(x) = x. Now, we know from cumulative prospect
theory that v is strictly increasing. Approximating it by a linear function we can
simplify a lot the definition setting v(x) = x. This explains why the examples
in Section 6 fit the experimental data very well: they have been conducted
with relatively small monetary outcomes and there were no possible losses. Of
course, it is predictable that in case of possible large gains and/or losses, this
approximation will create problems.
(2) The definition of the value of a coalition and then the definition of the coop-
erative equilibrium rely in the computation of Nash equilibria of the games Gp
and Ind(G, p). The computation of Nash equilibria uses expected utility theory,
precisely in the definition of the mixed extension of the gain functions. Unfortu-
nately, the natural translation of Nash equilibrium in the language of cumulative
prospect theory leads to define an object that might not exist (see [Cr90] and,
more generally, [Fi-Pa10]). To avoid this problem we consider a solution concept
which is a bit more general than Nash equilibrium, the so-called equilibrium in
beliefs, introduced by Crawford in [Cr90]. Crawford’s equilibria in beliefs have
the good property to exist in our context, contain all Nash equilibria, and reduce
to Nash equilibria in many cases. The remainder of the section is devoted to
this.
Before recalling the definition of an equilibrium in beliefs, we need to do a prelimi-
nary step, that is writing the mixed extension of the gain functions in the language of
cumulative prospect theory. Since notation will get complicated very soon, we start by
an example.
Example 9.1. Consider the (already reduced) game with gain matrix:
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
Assume that the column-player (player 1) plays the mixed strategy σ1 =
1
8C +
7
8D and
player 2 plays the mixed strategy σ2 =
1
4C +
3
4D. Under expected utility theory, we
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would have
g1(σ1, σ2) =
∑
x∈S1
∑
y∈S2
g1(x, y)σ1(x)σ2(y).
Let us compute step by step this number to put in evidence where and how expected
utility theory must be replaced by cumulative prospect theory. Fix σ2 as before and
observe that we have a finite family of prospects, one for each pure strategy of the first
player. In this example, they are:
p(C,σ2) =
(
2,
1
4
; 0,
3
4
)
and p(D,σ2) =
(
3,
1
4
; 1,
3
4
)
.
Now, under expected utility theory (and this is the first point where expected util-
ity theory is used), one computes the values of the two prospects, obtaining, in this
particular example, the values
V1(C, σ2) = 2 ·
1
4
+ 0 ·
3
4
=
1
2
and V1(D,σ2) = 3 ·
1
4
+ 1 ·
3
4
=
3
2
.
Of course, these numbers are equal to the ones that are usually denoted by g1(C, σ2)
and g2(D,σ2), respectively. Now, to compute the value usually denoted by g1(σ1, σ2),
one first constructs one more prospect using the measure σ1, that is
p(σ1,σ2) =
(
1
2
,
1
8
;
3
2
,
7
8
)
,
and finally, again under expected utility theory, one computes the value of this prospect,
obtaining the well known value g1(σ1, σ2).
We want to replace the classical values gi(σi, σ−i) with new values Vi(σi, σ−i), ob-
tained replacing expected utility theory with cumulative prospect theory. From the
example, it is clear that, to compute Vi(σi, σ−i) in cumulative prospect theory, we only
need to compute first Vi(si, σ−i), for all si ∈ Pli, using cumulative prospect theory on
the prospects p(si,σ−i), and then compute Vi(σ1, σ2) using cumulative prospect theory
on the prospect p(σi,σ−i). To make this idea formal, recall that in cumulative prospect
theory the outcomes of a prospect are supposed to be ordered in increasing way. It
is then useful to associate to each prospect p = (x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn), with distinct out-
comes17 xi ∈ R, a permutation ρ(p) that is just the permutation of the xi’s such that
ρ(p)(xi) < ρ(p)(xi+1), for all i. Now for all (si, s−i) ∈ Pli × Pl−i, we define
A
(si,s−i)
i :=
{
s′i ∈ Pl−i : gi(si, s−i) = gi(si, s
′
−i)
}
.
For any fixed si, the sets Ai’s form a partition of Pl−i. Choose a transversal Tsi for this
partition, that is, Tsi is a subset of Pl−i constructed picking exacty one point for each
set Ai. Now fix (σi, σ−i) ∈ P(Pli)× P(Pl−i) and define the prospect
p(si,σ−i) =
(
gi(si, s−i), σ−i
(
A
(si,s−i)
i
))
,
where s−i runs over the transversal Tsi . Of course, this prospect does not depend on
the particular transversal we fixed. Now, the outcomes of this prospect might not be
ordered in increasing way. Therefore, before applying cumulative prospect theory to
compute Vi
(
si, p
(si,σ−i)
)
we must apply the permutation ρ
(
p(si,σ−i)
)
. Consequently,
17If this prospect does not contain the zero-payoff, we add it with probability zero.
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with the notation as in Section 7, we obtain
Vi
(
si, p
(si,σ−i)
)
=
∑
s−i∈Tsi
pis−iv
(
ρ
(
p(si,σ−i)
)
(gi(si, s−i))
)
.
To construct the second prospect p(σi,σ−i), we follow an analogous procedure. Let
B
(si,σ−i)
i =
{
s′i ∈ Pli : Vi(si, σ−i) = Vi(s
′
i, σ−i)
}
.
The Bi’s form a partition of Pli. Let Tσ−i be a transversal for this partition. We define
the prospect
p(σi,σ−i) =
(
Vi(si, σ−i), σi
(
B
(si,σ−i)
i
))
,
where si runs over Tσ−i . Therefore we obtain
Vi(σi, σ−i) =
∑
si∈Tσ
−i
pisiv
ρ(p(σi,σ−i))
 ∑
s−i∈Tsi
pis−iv
(
ρ
(
p(si,σ−i)
))
(gi(si, s−i))
 .
One is now tempted to define a Nash equilibrium of a game under cumulative prospect
theory as a profile (σ1, . . . , σN ) of mixed strategies such that for all i ∈ P and for all
σ′i ∈ P(Si) one has Vi(σi, σ−i) ≥ Vi(σ
′
i, σ−i). As mentioned before, unfortunately,
there are games without Nash equilibria in this sense. To avoid this problem, we use
Crawford’s trick to extend the set of Nash equilibria including the so-called equilibria
in beliefs. To do that, first we recall the following classical definition.
Definition 9.2. Let D ⊆ Rn be a convex set and let φ : D → R be a function. The
upper contour set of φ at a ∈ R is the set
Uφ(a) = {x ∈ D : φ(x) ≥ a} .
g is called quasiconcave on D if Uφ(a) is a convex set for all a ∈ R.
The following definition appeared in [Cr90], Definition 3. In this definition the word
game is used to denote a classical finite game in normal form G = G(P, S, u), where the
utility functions are extended to the mixed strategies in a possibly non-linear manner.
Definition 9.3. The convexified version of a game is obtained from the game by re-
placing each player’s preferences by the quasiconcave preferences whose upper contour
sets are the convex hulls of his original upper contour sets, leaving other aspects of the
game unchanged.
We now define Crawford’s equilibria in beliefs through an equivalent condition proved
by Crawford himself in [Cr90], Theorem 1.
Definition 9.4. An equilibrium in beliefs is any Nash equilibrium of the convexified
version of the game.
Crawford proved in [Cr90], Observation 1, that a Nash equilibrium is always an
equilibrium in beliefs and, in Observation 2, that the set of equilibria in beliefs coincides
with the set of Nash equilibria if the players have quasiconcave preferences.
We can now define the cooperative equilibria of a game in explicit form.
Definition 9.5. The cooperative equilibria of a game in explicit form G = G(P, S, g, g, a, f)
are obtained applying to the reduced game Red(G) the procedure described in Section
4, replacing
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• the function gi(σ) with the function Vi(σ),
• the notion of Nash equilibrium with the notion of equilibrium in beliefs,
• the value function vi(p) in (1) with the one in (15).
Theorem 9.6. Cooperative equilibria exist for all finite games in explicit form.
Proof. Let G = G(P, S, g, g, a, f) be a finite game in explicit form. We have already
proved in Section 8 that the iterated deletion of strategies leads to a well defined and
non-empty subgame Red(G). We shall prove that the construction in Section 4 can be
applied to Red(G).
Fix a coalition structure p and let Gp be the game obtained by Red(G) grouping
together the players in the same coalition, as in Equation (2). By Crawford’s theorem
(see [Cr90], Theorem 2), the set of equilibria in beliefs of Gp is not empty. Indeed, this
is just the set of Nash equilibria of the convexified game. Now, since the preferences in
cumulative prospect theory are described by a continuous function and since continuity
is preserved by passing to the convexified version (see [Ro70], Theorem 17.2), it follows
that the set of equilibria in beliefs of Gp is compact. Consequently, the sets M(pα, p)
in Equation (3) are non-empty and the definition of the induced game Ind(G, p) goes
through. Observe that the induced game is not empty, since the value of a prospect is at
most as the maximal outcome of the prospect, which is an infimum of values attained by
the composed function v ◦ Vi. Therefore, the set of σ’s such that (v ◦ Vi)(σ) ≥ v
CPT
i (σ)
is non-empty. Consequently, the set of mixed strategies of the induced game is a non-
empty convex and compact subset of the set of mixed strategies of the original game G.
Since in the convexified version of a game the set of mixed strategies does not change, the
convexified version of Ind(G, p) has a non-empty set of Nash equilibria (Indeed, observe
that Nash’s proof of existence of equilibria goes through also if only distinguished convex
and compact subsets of mixed strategies are allowed). Applying Theorem 1 in [Cr90],
it follows that the induced game Ind(G, p) has a non-empty set of equilibria in beliefs.
Hence, Definition 4.14 defines a non-empty notion of equilibrium.
Consequently, Definition 9.5 defines a non-empty notion of equilibrium. 
The following corollary follows straight from the construction.
Corollary 9.7. The exact cooperative equilibrium of a game G does not depend on the
fairness functions and on the altruism parameters, if
(1) G does not have any super-dominated strategies,
(2) for every coalition structure p, the game Gp has a unique equilibrium in beliefs.
Remark 9.8. Also in this case we may define the quantal cooperative equilibrium
under cumulative prospect theory and taking into account altruism: agent i plays
with probability ev
CPT
i (p)/
∑
p e
vCPTi (p) a quantal level-k solution of the induced game
Ind(Red(G), p). Such quantal cooperative equilibrium explains deviations from Nash
equilibrium that have been observed also in purely competitive games, as the asymmet-
ric matching pennies experimented in [Go-Ho01], that is, the game with gains:
L R
U 320, 40 40, 80
D 40, 80 80, 40
It was reported in [Go-Ho01] that most of vertical players played the strategy U and
most of the horizontal players played the strategy R. Observe that the Nash equilibrium
for the vertical player is the uniform measure on {U,D}, since the gains of the horizontal
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player are the same as in the matching pennies. We believe that this behavior ultimately
relies in a mistake of the vertical players due to the illusion of a large gain and this
mistake is predicted by the horizontal player. This interpretation is confirmed by the
cooperative equilibrium. Indeed, the value of the cooperative coalition is easily seen to
be equal to 40 for both players and, therefore, exact cooperative equilibrium reduces
to the Nash equilibrium and quantal cooperative equilibrium reduces to the quantal
level-k solution. The latter one performs well in such a situation: if the vertical player
makes the mistake to think that the horizontal player is level-0 and then she or he
is indefferent between playing L and R, then the vertical player would have a strong
incentive to play the strategy U . At this point, the assumption that the horizontal
player is level-2 implies that she or he best responds (up to a small mistake) to the
strong deviation towards U , which is a strong deviation towards R.
10. Summary, conclusions and open problems
Over the last decades it has been realised that all classical solution concepts for one-
shot normal form games fail to predict human behavior in several strategic situations.
The purpose of this paper was to attribute these failures to two basic problems, the use
of utility functions and the use of solution concepts that do not take into account human
attitude to cooperation. While the former problem could be theoretically overcome
replacing utility functions by gain functions and applying cumulative prospect theory,
the second problem needs a different analysis of the structure of a game. We founded
this new analysis on a seemingly reasonable principle of cooperation.
(C) Players try to forecast how the game would be played if they formed coalitions
and then they play according to their best forecast.
To make this idea formal, it has required some effort. In Section 2 we have observed
that passing from utility functions to gain functions implies that we must take into
account new phenomena, such as altruism and perception of gains. We have formal-
ized these phenomena defining the so-called games in explicit form. After an example
describing informally the main idea, in Section 4 we have formalized the principle of
cooperation and we have defined the cooperative equilibrium for games in explicit form
without using altruism parameters and cumulative prospect theory. The reason of this
choice is that altruism and cumulative prospect theory play an active role only on a
limited class of games. Indeed, in Section 5 we have shown that the cooperative equi-
librium without altruism and cumulative prospect theory already performs well in a
number of relevant games. In Section 6 we have discussed a few examples where cumu-
lative prospect theory starts playing an active role and, after a short introduction to
cumulative prospect theory in Section 7, we have started to adapt the definition given of
cooperative equilibrium given in Definition 4.14 in order to be applied to every game in
explicit form and using cumulative prospect theory. In Section 8 we have used altruism
parameters to delete strategies that are not good for the collectivity. This iterated dele-
tion of strategies leads to define a certain subgame. The study of this subgame (done
in Section 4 under expected utility theory and in Section 9 under cumulative prospect
theory) contains all relevant new ideas of the paper, that are, the use of the principle
of cooperation and the use of cumulative prospect theory: we have assumed that every
players try to forecast how the game would be played if they formed coalition; we have
used cumulative prospect theory to define a notion of value of a coalition and then, ap-
pealing to some Bernoulli-type principle, we have postulated that agents play according
to the coalition with highest value.
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As shown in the examples in Section 5, the theory has many positive consequences: to
the best of our knowledge, it is the first theory able to organize the experimental data
collected for the Traveler’s Dilemma, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Nash bargaining problem,
Bertrand competition, public good game, ultimatum game, and dictator game. These
successful applications and the lack of examples where the cooperative equilibrium fails
(qualitatively) to predict human behavior, make us optimistic about this direction of
research. Nevertheless, we are perfectly aware that the theory is questionable in several
points which deserve more attention in future researches. These points include:
(1) To understand if there are other parameters to be taken into account in the
definition of games in explicit form. In particular, there is some evidence that
badness parameters can play an important role in some situations, one of which
is described in the following point.
(2) To understand what happens if the players do not agree in playing according
to the same coalition structure. Indeed, the cooperative equilibrium works very
well in all examples we have discussed since there is a unique coalition structure
p that maximizes the value of all players. What happens if different players
have different coalition structures maximizing their own value? Do all players
defect and play according to the coalition structure generated by the maximiz-
ing coalition structures, that is, the coarsest coalition which is finer than all
maximizing coalition structures? Or, do the players agree to play the fairest
coalition structures? In this latter case, what happens if there are many fairest
coalition structures? Do the players play uniformly among them?
The difficulty in understanding this point is due mainly to the lack of rele-
vant examples where this situation happens. In fact, we are aware of only one
example, where this situation is about to happen. We construct this game taking
inspiration by a similar game recently experimented in [We-Ra]. Two players
have the same strategy set S1 = S2 = S = {0, 1, . . . , 30}. The gain functions
are as follows:
g1(x, y) =
{
30 − x, if x ≥ y
0, if x < y
and g2(x, y) ≡ 30.
Let us compute the cooperative equilibrium of this game. The unique equi-
librium of the cooperative coalition structure pc = {1, 2} is (0, 0), where both
players get 30. Observe that no players have incentive to deviate from this
equilibrium and consequently, the values of pc are
v1(pc) = 30 and v2(pc) = 30.
Now consider the selfish coalition structure ps = ({1}, {2}). The value for
the second player is again v2(ps) = 30, whereas this time one gets v1(ps) = 15.
Indeed, this is one of the cases where the natural symmetry of the game implies
that we can restrict the set M˜({2}, ps) taking its barycenter. In other words,
when player 2 plays according to ps, she is indifferent among her choices and so
she plays uniformly. Player 1’s best reply to player 2’s uniform measure is the
uniform measure, that gives payoff 15. Since this is a Nash equilibrium, there
are no possible deviations and so v2(ps) = 15.
So in this case, the unique cooperative equilibrium is (0, 0). In other words,
player 2 favors player 1 playing 0 and player 1 knows that player 2 is going to
favor her and so she plays 0 as well. This seems a very natural solution but: Do
humans really play (0, 0)?
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We tried to simulate this game with colleagues and friends and something
interesting apparently came out. One friend, asked to play the game in the role
of player 2, said: “It depends. If player 1 is very rich, I would play 30 for sure!”.
The most common question we were asked after explaining the game was: “Do
I know the other player?”. After asking to imagine an anonymous situation, the
most common answer (nine out of ten) was: “Why should I hurt a person that
I do not know? I would play 0.”. One person said: “I don’t care! I would pick
a number randomly”.
Of course, these cannot be considered as experimental data, but we believe
that they represent however a light evidence that badness parameters do exist.
It is not yet clear to the author how to manage them from a general point of
view and we will postpone the theorization to a new paper hopefully helped by
more experimental data. However, we can say right now how these parameters
would effect the play of this particular game. We guess that the badness param-
eters bij are non-negative real numbers, where bij = 0 represents the situation
where player i is absolutely good against player j, that is, player i favors player j
whenever possible, and bij =∞ represents the situation where player i is abso-
lutely bad against player j. As said, it is not yet clear which would be the exact
mathematical definition and the exact effect of these parameters on a general
game, but the idea is that in this particular version of the Ultimatum game,
the second player plays according to the parameter b21 and player 1 estimates
a priori the parameter b21 and plays a best reply to the strategy that player 2
would play if her badness parameters were equal to player 2’s estimation.
(3) The formula used in Equation (1) to compute the value of a coalition seems
a quite reasonable one and it meets the experimental data quite well, but it
is certainly only a first tentative. More thoughts, possibly supported by more
experimental data, may help to understand the value of a coalition. The main
point is probably:
• to understand whether the value should be computed taking into account
also deviations towards safe strategies.
Indeed, consider the two-player game with gain matrix
a b
a 1, 1 0,−k
b −k, 0 10, 10
The cooperative equilibrium is (b, b) independently on k. Is this reasonable
or for k large enough players prefer not to risk and play the safe strategy (a, a)?
(4) The formula used in Equation (1) to compute the value of a coalition is ques-
tionable on another point. In the definition of the numbers Rj(p), we have
considered the first step of the reasoning: if player j decides to abandon the
coalition structure p, then another player, say k, may do the same either to fol-
low selfish interests or because she or he is clever enough to anticipate player j
deviation. But, if player j is also clever enough to anticipate player k’s deviation,
then player j may deviate from the deviation, and so forth. We could continue
this reasoning and define the risk Rj(p) to be, roughly speaking, the maximal
lost that player j incurs when a profile of strategies that can be reached by a se-
quence of deviations is played. Of course, this definition would come at the price
of a major technical difficulty, but it would be theoretically more appealing, since
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it would allow to construct a bridge from the cooperative equilibrium theory to
another well studied behavioral model. We recall that τi,J(p) has been called
prior probability, since, despite being an apparently very precise evaluation of
how player i measures the event “players in J abandon the coalition structure
p”, it is well possible that a specific player i, for personal reasons, evaluates this
event in a completely different way. In particular, the number τi,∅ represents
the probability that player i assigns to the event that no players abandon the
coalition. The types of players that are usually called, in economic literature,
altruistic (resp. selfish) would then correspond to those players i who compute
the value of a coalition setting τi,∅ = 1 (resp. τi,∅ = 0), independently of the
prior value of such a probability. The correspondence between selfish players
and players who set τi,∅ = 0 fails using the formula in (1), since this formula
with τi,∅ = 0 can still predict cooperation, even though in a smaller rate, as, for
instance, in the Traveler’s dilemma.
(5) The exact computation of the cooperative equilibrium is hard for several rea-
sons. First because it goes through the computation of the equilibria in be-
liefs of several18 (sub)games. These equilibria are computationally hard to find
[Da-Go-Pa06]. Second, because it uses cumulative prospect theory, that is com-
putationally harder than expected utility theory. On one hand, the method that
we have proposed is perfectly algorithmic and therefore it might be helpful to
write a computer program to compute the cooperative equilibria and make easier
the phase of test them on easy real-life situations. On the other hand, it would
be important to investigate some computationally easier variant. Of course,
quantal level-k theory can be seen as a computationally easier variant, but this
theory has the serious issue that it would not be predictive, in the sense that
one has to conduct experiments to estimate the error parameter. One could try
to avoid this problem using the level-k theory (i.e., only bounded rationality).
(6) Iterated deletion of strategies using altruism functions in Section 8 was certainly
quite sketchy and it is likely that future researches will suggest a different pro-
cedure. In particular, the definition of unplayable strategies of the second type
for player i requires that only one particular player j receives a large loss. It is
possible that this condition is not sufficient to convince player i to renounce to
her better strategy, in case when the players in P \ {i, j} receives a large gain.
(7) We have defined altruism functions operationally, meaning that one could theo-
retically compute them by conducting an experiment on the generalized dictator
game. It would be important to find an operational way to define the fairness
functions.
Open problems include:
(1) Many experiments with different purposes should be conducted. Indeed, an
interesting fact is that cooperative equilibrium makes sometimes completely new
predictions. A stream of experiments should be devoted to verify or falsify these
predictions. For instance,
• Apparently, the cooperative equilibrium is the unique solution concept pre-
dicting an increasing rate of cooperation in the public good game, as the
18As observed by J. Halpern in a private communication, it is implausible that an agent would consider
all coalitions. In even moderately large games, there are just too many of them. She may consider some
natural coalitions (e.g., the coalition of all agents), but only a relatively small number. Of course, a
theory characterizing which coalitions would be considered is not easy to come by.
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marginal return approaches 1. It seems that this prediction has a partial
confirmation from experimental data, but, as far as we know, only one
experiment has been devoted to report this behavior, that is, [IWW94].
Analogously, it seems that the cooperative equilibrium (under cumulative
prospect theory) is the unique solution concept predicting or, at least, jus-
tifying a rate of cooperation in the public good game with a large number
of players. Also in this case, we are aware of only one experimental study
devoted to observe this unexpected behavior, that is, again, [IWW94].
• Apparently, the cooperative equilibrium is the unique solution concept
predicting a rate of cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma depending on
the particular gains. It seems that this prediction is partially confirmed
by experimental data, but only on the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma (see
[DRFN08] and [Fu-Ra-Dr12]). Experiments with a one-shot parametrized
Prisoner’s dilemma should be conducted to verify or falsify this prediction.
Another stream of experiments should be devoted to answer some theoretical
questions. At this first stage of research, we believe that the most important
one is:
• to understand whether the value of a coalition structure should be computed
taking into account also deviations towards safe strategies.
(2) Have a better understanding of the relation between Nash equilibria and cooper-
ative equilibria (under expected utility theory) for two-person zero-sum games,
when the players have the same perception of gains. Indeed, Nash equilibrium
performs quite well for zero-sum games and it is possible that all deviations from
Nash equilibrium can be explained only making use of cumulative prospect the-
ory. Therefore, it would be important to understand if the cooperative equilib-
rium (under expected utility theory and assuming f1 = f2) refines Nash equilib-
rium, in the sense that the set of exact cooperative equilibria is always a subset
of the set of Nash equilibria. In this context, it would also be interesting to
start from relevant classes of zero-sum games, as the group games, introduced
and studied in [Mo10], [Ca-Mo12], [Ca-Sc12]. Of course, also a counter-example
would be very important to understand if and where the theory can be modified.
(3) As stressed several times, the probability τi,J(p) is just a prior probability, in the
sense that it is well possible that a particular player i computes this probability in
a completely different way. It would be important to understand the factors that
may influence the evaluation of this probability. For instance, it is well known
that individual-level rate of cooperation depends on family history, age, culture,
gender, even university course [Ma-Am81], religious beliefs [HRZ11], and time
decision [RGN12]. The dream is to incorporate this factors into parameters to
use to compute the probability τi at an individual-level. Particularly interesting
would also be the study of this probability when players can talk each other or
have any sort of contact (e.g., eye-contact). Indeed, these contacts can create
phenomena of mental reading (see [Wi-MN-GJ]) that we believe can be explained
in terms of evaluation of the probability τ .
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